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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Final Judgment and Commitment in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, for conviction by way 
of jury before Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henriod on December 17, 
1998, in which the Court found Defendant James Thompson guilty of 
COUNT I, MAKING A FALSE TAX RETURN, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101 and Title 59, 
Chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; 
and COUNT II, WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX, a Second Degree 
Felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101 and 
Title 59, Chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code § 78-3a-909 
(1996) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the prosecution carried its burden of proof 
with respect to the defendant' s intentional evasion of income tax 
when the defense clearly demonstrated that the defendant relied 
on the W-2 and 1099 tax forms prepared by his employer. On 
appeal, the appellate court reviews the record in the light most 
favorable to the jury' s verdict and recites the facts 
accordingly. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury that if the jury found that the defendant relied in good 
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faith on the tax forms prepared by his employer that they could 
not find the defendant guilty of intentional or willful tax 
evasion or of making a false tax return. This issue was 
preserved for appeal at Tr. 476.16-19 and 477.8-13. The 
propriety of the trial court' s ruling on the defendant' s properly 
timed objection is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness with no deference accorded the trial court' s 
decision. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant the 
defendant' s motion for a new trial when the State' s key witnesses 
offered testimony at trial which differed from their testimony at 
the preliminary hearing, including the material testimony of 
witness Allen Davis who testified that he gained possession of 
the document, which became the State' s first exhibit, in a manner 
which was inconsistent with the previous representations of the 
prosecutor, and whether this issue bears further appellate 
scrutiny in light of the fact that subsequent to the trial 
court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial, based 
in part on the prosecutor' s affidavit, the prosecutor assumed a 
position of employment with the defendant' s former employer, the 
employer of the State' s key witnesses, and in essence assumed the 
defendant' s former position. The granting or refusing of a 
motion for a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and the appellate court will not disturb its action unless 
it appears that the discretion has been abused to the prejudice 
of the defendant. State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 
2 
1989). Prosecutorial misconduct may be grounds for a new trial. 
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1988). 
4. Whether this Court should order a new trial in this 
matter in light of the fact that the trial court' s video 
malfunctioned and failed to preserve for the record testimony 
offered by a key witness for the State when the defendant has 
argued in this appeal that his conviction for tax evasion was 
against the clear weight of the evidence presented to the jury. 
The burdens and futility associated with reconstructing a record 
are increased exponentially when the issue on appeal concerns the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction. State v. 
Tunzi, 2000 UT 38 (Utah 2000) (ordering a new trial to remedy an 
incomplete trial transcript). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. On appeal, the appellate court reviews the record in 
the light most favorable to the jury' s verdict and recites the 
facts accordingly. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 
1997). The appellate court will reverse a jury' s verdict in a 
criminal case only when it concludes as a matter of law that the 
evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction. State v. 
Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 937 P.2d 
136 (Utah 1997) . 
2. The propriety of the trial court's decision to sustain 
the prosecution* s objection to the defendant1 s proposed jury 
instruction is a question of law which the appellate court 
reviews for correctness without affording any deference to the 
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trial court's ruling. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 844 (Utah 1992). 
3. The granting or refusal of a motion for a new trial 
lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the 
appellate court will not disturb the trial court' s decision 
unless it appears that the discretion has been abused to the 
prejudice of the defendant. State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
4. The burdens and futility associated with reconstructing 
a record are increased exponentially when the issue on appeal 
concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction. 
State v. Tunzi, 2000 UT 38, (Utah 2000). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or 
rules referenced in this brief and pertinent to the issues now 
before the court on appeal are contained herein or are attached 
to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, James Thompson, was alleged to have committed 
the offense of ONE COUNT OF MAKING A FALSE TAX RETURN, A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1101 and § 
59-1-401; AND ONE COUNT OF WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1101 
and § 59-1-401. 
On December 14-17, 1998, a jury trial was held regarding the 
charges against Mr. Thompson in the Third District Court for Salt 
Lake County, Utah with Judge Stephen L. Henriod presiding. At 
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trial, the prosecution called eight witnesses and the defense 
called two. On December 17, 1998, following three hours of 
deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict with respect to 
both counts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State called eight witnesses who gave testimony 
regarding the elements of the crimes with which Mr. Thompson was 
charged. Marshaled in favor of the jury1 s verdict, this evidence 
may be summarized as follows: 
1. As the State's first witness, the prosecution called 
attorney Allen Davis. (Tr. 43. 13-14). Allen Davis served as 
corporate counsel for Neways, Inc. in a position subordinate to 
the defendant. Mr. Davis testified that the defendant had 
recruited him from a law firm in Boise, Idaho and that in so 
doing the defendant had commented that one of the advantages of 
working for Neways was that income could be earned tax free. 
(Tr. 45.8-19). One of the methods that tax free income could be 
earned would be to eventually set up an off-shore corporation 
that could provide legal services to Neways. Neways could then 
pay the off-shore corporation the fee for legal services which 
the corporation could deposit into an off-shore bank. (Tr. 45-
14-19) . Mr. Davis and the defendant could then retrieve that 
money via an ATM and the money would then be untraceable. (Tr. 
46. 7-12). Mr. Davis testified that as one of his duties at 
Neways the defendant created several off-shore corporations for 
Neways, but that he was unaware of the defendant ever personally 
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using one for off-shore transactions. (Tr. AS.21; 82.17-19). 
Mr. Davis then testified that the defendant had told him 
that he had negotiated a deal with the owner of Neways in which 
the owners agreed to reduce the salary paid to the defendant from 
approximately $60,000 to pay him a base salary of $20,000. The 
remaining amount was to be paid directly to Mr. Thompson and to 
third parties on Mr. Thompson's behalf. (Tr. 47.1-6). Mr. Davis 
testified that the defendant' s number one reason for this 
arrangement was to avoid paying higher child support. (Tr. 4 7.7-
12; 61.1). 
Mr. Davis then testified that the defendant showed him a 
journal in February of 1997 of his personal financial dealings. 
Mr. Davis testified that he copied the journal in July of 1997 
upon the defendant' s termination from Neways. (Tr. 56). Mr. 
Davis then testified as to what the defendant told him regarding 
the significance of the different journal entries as they related 
to his salary of $21,000 and his total income of $60,000. (Tr. 
59.20-25; 74.18-22). Mr. Davis testified that the journal 
entries showed payments made by Neways to Mr. Thompson and to 
third parties on his behalf. (Tr. 63-65). According to Mr. 
Thompson's journal he had received a total of $75,000 in 1996. 
(Ex. 1). 
Mr. Davis then testified that in February of 1997, the 
accountants at Neways prepared a 1099 tax form for the defendant, 
and that Mr. Davis had directed them in its preparation. (Tr. 
67.20-24). He then testified that when the defendant received 
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the 1099 he was furious, and that Mr. Davis felt it was because 
he didn't want a 1099. Mr. Davis then testified that Mr. 
Thompson told him that he had asked one of the accountants, 
Annette Jenkins, to zero out the 1099. (Tr. 69.18). However, 
when he asked Ms. Jenkins about it, she told him that Mr. 
Thompson did not make such a request, nor did anyone else at 
Neways. (Tr. 83.23-24). Eventually, the amount of income stated 
on the 1099 was reduced in a subsequent 1099 issued to the 
defendant. (Tr. 69.24-70.18). Mr. Davis testified that he felt 
the original amount was accurate, but that Mrs. Mower, the 
company' s owner, told him that her investigation and information 
assured her that the reduced amount was accurate. (Tr. 97.19-
98.7) . 
Mr. Davis testified that the defendant was given a car to 
use by Neways for business purposes and that the defendant paid 
for gas, some of which Neways reimbursed to him. Mr. Davis also 
testified that no 1099 was prepared for the defendant' s personal 
use of the vehicle, and that he was unaware that money had been 
taken out of Mr. Thompson' s check each pay day therefor. (Tr. 
71.25; 87.14-17). 
2. The State's second witness was Karin Lane. The entire 
remainder of the hearing on the first day, including the 
testimony of Ms. Lane, was not recorded allegedly due to 
equipment malfunction. (Tr. 113.13-14). 
3. The State's third witness was the Defendant's landlord, 
Mark Daniel Fish. (Tr. 126-130) . Mr. Fish testified that he 
7 
received the defendant1 s initial deposit and first month* s rent 
in the form of a corporate check issued by Neways. (Tr. 12 8.1-
2). Mr. Fish also testified that he and the defendant had 
discussed the possibility of exchanging legal services and real 
estate services, but that this check was for rent. (Tr. 128.17-
25; 130.9-25). 
4. The State's fourth witness was Annette Jenkins, an 
accountant employed by Neways. Ms. Jenkins testified that for 
about his first four months of employment, the defendant earned 
approximately $60,000 per year but that at the end of 1995, she 
received instructions from a Neways owner that the defendant' s 
salary would be set at $21,000 and that the remainder of the 
defendant's income would be disbursed through accounts payable. 
(Tr. 133. 7-20; 152. 9-16). Ms. Jenkins testified that the 
defendant' s salary income was paid through an employee leasing 
company and recorded as W-2 income, whereas all other income was 
paid directly to him or to third parties in his behalf, and that 
income was reported as 10 99 income, and that had been the 
arrangement with the defendant and her understanding. (Tr. 165. 
7-23). Ms. Jenkins also testified that when the defendant 
received his 1099 he contacted her to adjust the amount shown as 
1099 income to reflect what he had actually received, because he 
felt the original was too high. (Tr. 143.5-13; 166-68;173-75). 
5. The State' s fifth witness was Angela Howell, an 
employee of Neways who worked as the defendant's paralegal. Ms. 
Howell testified that the defendant asked her to fill out check 
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request forrrs : :: L - e . 'f hj s .nrcrre r^. i regular basis. (Tr 
] :: - 'T A "• . ' ^ • . - ; . - .- > • jssed the 
defenaant maKi::9 ^ n m . ^ s ... .^  ^ c o ^ n i . , .._;_^ . m a t reflected 
brr n his salaried income and the amounts par;: by Neways to third 
par ti es • :: t i 1 i 3 1: >eha] f (1 : 1 81 4 6) I I, 3 I L : \ * < i ] ] fi 12 "ther 
testified that she saw the original 1099 which the defendant 
received and that when he received the : M-T -he defendant wished 
t v e t:l ICE <: c ;< : >i 1: l e •.• :• - 2 3 ) 1 1 3 . 
Howell testified that every employee in * ":e Neways legal 
department other than *:h^ defendant was paid stri ctly on a 
salaried basis .
 x . . - Howel 1 testi f :i e i that si le 
assisted the defendant in making inquiri es of off-shore banks 
t pixn d ded ma :i 1:1 1 and access 1 : I Tl Is (T ] 8 6 1! 5 23) 
6. As the StaLe; s sixth A i m e ^ , he prosecution called 
Ned Shimizu, an :: nvesr ; gat.or wirh the "Tt'^ h State Tax Commissi on. 
Mr i 1 t 1: ecei pt c f ai 1 ai 1 ::>i: ry n: 101 is 
tip, from Allen Davis ne believed, h: s c.tfice initiated an 
investigation of " h^ - lefendart whi^h '^-^ tided the anal ysi s of the 
defendant's W 2, . -  : . . . : „ : . : . - _ ._ _\.. . 9 tax forms. (Tr. 
196.20) , Following rh^ examination of r :;ese records, Mi Shi n i.:i zu 
t < = • - * - " x -----: '- - • - — • ) - - - . . - •" - - -v * \-, 
wii-u JT: . JIi.^  *jy CACLUI.. \ \. iiL ** < ,
 tj.c«^rn-, w„ . , '_.ie _ neeK.S pa^ J * -
Neways to third part:*-? or; whut he belie*, ed v.: r>e rhe defendant's 
t~ - .1 
entries, references :J Mr, inompson or r t;r>^  jega, departme:' . r 
by Annette Jenkins on check requests, plus many checks that Cr aig 
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Spencer had added up from the general ledger that he felt were 
for the defendant's benefit. Although many of such checks were 
never negotiated, canceled, or located, Mr. Shimizu felt they 
should be included in his re-calculation based on his "best 
guess" and because he "hoped" that these were not among the 
accounting mistakes that he knew Neways had made with regard to 
other checks that they had mistakenly attributed to the 
defendant. (Tr. 207. 18-25; 217-26; 232-35; 239. 11-25). 
Adding up all of these amounts, the total dollar figure which Mr. 
Shimizu arrived at amounted to $73,233.86, approximately $10,000 
more than Neways had reported in its W-2s and 10 99s to Mr. 
Thompson. (Tr. 202.6-14). Based on this re-calculation of 
income, Mr. Shimizu opined that the defendant owed a net tax 
deficiency of $2,142.46. (Tr. 203.20-21). 
7. As the State's seventh witness, the prosecution called 
Becky MacKenzie, an accountant employed by the Utah State Tax 
Commission as an expert on tax matters. Ms. MacKenzie testified 
that she examined the federal and state tax returns filed by the 
defendant in connection with the investigation which her office 
had initiated against the defendant. (Tr. 259). Ms. MacKenzie 
testified that payments made by an employer on behalf of an 
employee to third parties would be considered income to the 
employee. (Tr. 260.16-18, 262.2). Ms. MacKenzie also testified 
that wages could not be reported on a Schedule C and that a 
taxpayer cannot take a business deduction against wages for a 
vehicle, advertising, office expenses or utility payments. (Tr. 
10 
2 62.9-263.24). Ms. MacKenzie testified that i t was her opinion 
t - • " ~ . - was ri^ *- ^::t:tled +: " ar,r c--^^^,;]e - deductions 
based ,u n-. . ^..ierstandmg t;.a: ..<_ ::, .
 ti::*^ 
as an employee of Newavs. (Tr. 274. - Based '::: :r. ..-
£ . ir • • <* < :->^ • ]>~ \ r - testifv:r.~ ^h^t she haa 
examined the defendarr ' s L Q A oiaLemeuts and LAU:,.::'.: '.n^ 
documents created by Ned Shimizu, and determined that the 
defendant iw,! ,i in'f i j <, deficn:nr'v M( '> ] 42 56 (Tr 26 7 3 9) 
Ms, MacKenzie also testified that determining whether a person is 
an employee or an i ndependent contractor i s extremely complex and 
the subject c f t:housai ids of cases aci oss 11 le I Ji :i 11ed St:at: = s ai i :i 
that she did not know whose legal obligation it is to determine 
the answer (Tr 2 76) , She also testified that normally r the 
worker makes tue aete:iu:nat;.,i; .:
 v i ^ 
She further testified tha^ : t t r\e employer incorrectly 
cateu - _ !--:"•- • • i 
employer thaT: must pa, ; i.e underpayment of taxe-
2 3 ) . v^^Kpp^i P ^11T~«- Vip r- i <=*c; *- j. f •' e'i 7 ^  af " - '*.^r D^SI t i or 
that ., ; . -„x j. _ . -A ;. \
 ; 
they gave h;rr- the 1 >i -
 f but. : w uie State had faiiea \ 'e--' the 
addd ti onal taxes fr-"~ N>wa,rb. vT^ ^Q - '^-. - . 
8. As the e_.;_... A . . ness f...~ * ^e . :a:e, _r;- pros- •_. i ~ I 
called Crajq Spencer, an accountant: ;-i Newaye r. Spencer 
t* . ' ' '- esponsi bl e f or 
ac 'OUIILS payabie ; «d.-b tax ana L.xea assets, . 305.3), Mr 
Spencer testified that it was his duty to assemble the financial 
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data pursuant to compiling the 1099 he gave to the defendant. 
(Tr. 319-322). Mr. Spencer then testified as to how he arrived 
at the figures which made up the original 1099, and that he 
signed the 1096 form swearing, under penalty of perjury, that the 
amounts shown in the defendant's 1099s were true and accurate. 
(Tr. 322-335). Mr. Spencer also testified that he did not speak 
with the defendant nor did he obtain any information from him in 
connection with determining the accuracy of the 1099s. (Tr. 353. 
2-11). Mr. Spencer was unsure about whether or not checks for 
thousands of dollars were for Mr. Thompson' s benefit or for 
Neways' s off-shore bank accounts, although he included those 
amounts in the defendant' s 1099s. (Tr. 362-68). 
9. As the ninth witness for the State, the prosecution re-
called Ned Shimizu who provided the Court with a summary of his 
opinions concerning the evidence in an exhibit type format. (Tr. 
412-415). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Notwithstanding the evidence marshaled in support of the 
jury' s verdict, the prosecution failed to carry its burden of 
proof with respect to the issue of whether the defendant acted 
intentionally or willfully to evade the tax due under the law or 
to make a false return. Rather, the prosecution inflamed the 
jury with prejudicial statements involving off-shore corporations 
and futuristic tax schemes notwithstanding the fact that the 
State presented no evidence whatsoever that such a plan was ever 
pursued. Rather, the only probative evidence introduced at trial 
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established that the defendant1 s investigation of off-shore 
coi: porations and/or banking was limited - •• -. r-t^ : nvest: nat: " rs 
made solely within the scope of his emp... . y:te:t. :•-•! ..-.•--.. 
international multi-level marketing company. The introduction of 
t he s e s t a t ement s s :i rop ] y s e rved t: :D contaminate t he j ury' s op i ni on 
of the defendant before the State introduced the substantive 
testimony whirr comprised the State's case : n rhief. 
surrounding the fact that cue a-ieiiaaix ..dj :nade a r r a n g e m e n t n i 
late 1995 to receive his -r.^^*- • ri a different manner than he had 
received previously, fc.^L*_.. • • ! * • • . . . 
received his income as a salaried employee of Neways, beginning 
:si i i 1! 9 96 the 1'"rtiv * r-ceivi-d V - —--nDensat i "^ %~ '" - f^rmi- <: i 
salary and i.. m e c k s made ;^. , .is t,e:,^i ;. ^ . u .tie/ . ^  r t* .nd 
to third parties. The- purpose for this arrangement, according to 
1 .1 .< t ' < --^- r - * ) 
tht-- defendant's chiia support ooiigat. ion.- . Tii'r only e v u t n c r to 
the court wa° h h ^ h *"K~- -iefendar* --^c^-v^^ a1: Mewavs* s 
discretioi 1 . . • . . > •.-:, 
income. Witn respect- 10- -rie 1099, T I ^ State made mucn r: r.hr 
fact that 'i i" ~-o~e" v" *% 7 1
 r — - - i ooo «-, .- defendant reau^ste'5. 
that Neway^ .ui.u i.t, ^ tatco J.,;*._*..1 icau^ea s.ig::i. . . : i-e.t 
n: • true income, and to exclude any a TIC ,ur s nc^ receivec oy 
' * > - . . . .
 e 
deiendant contacted 1..- uiscuss the l u ^ .esiii irj \..--4. * -
defendant oiu 2 wished to have, trie 1099 accurately reflect h u 
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personal income without including Neways' s business expenses 
incurred by him. The accountant agreed that the original 10 99 
seemed to include some amounts that were actually company 
expenses, and was assured by the company' s owner that such was in 
fact the case. Neways' s owner headed up a fact investigation and 
vouched for certain expenses that in fact were attributable to 
Neways, and directed the accountants to reduce those specific 
amounts from defendant's 1099 amount. The defendant made his 
records available to the owner and the accountants, but played no 
active part in the fact investigation. The only testimony before 
the Court was that the defendant did in fact rely on the tax 
statements prepared under penalty of perjury by Neways and its 
accountants under the direction of its owner, and filed the same 
with his tax returns in good faith reliance on the accuracy 
thereof. 
With respect to the issue of good faith reliance upon the 
tax statements prepared by his employer, the defendant submitted 
to the trial court a proposed jury instruction which stated that 
if the jury found that the defendant had in good faith relied 
upon the tax statements prepared by his employer, that the jury 
could not find that the defendant had acted intentionally or 
willfully and could not therefore find the defendant guilty of 
intentional tax evasion. The trial court' s failure to so advise 
the jury constituted reversible error. 
Following the defendant' s conviction, the defendant moved 
the trial court for a new trial based upon the inconsistent 
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statements 'made by key witnesses for the State. One such 
w11ness, ii at torne;y f : > i Neu ays had ofat:ained from the 
defendant's personal belongings a journal outlining the 
defendant's financial affairs. When defense counsel inquired of 
the prosecuti 01 i 1 101 v tl le wi ti less 1 lad obta :i ned ti le proper t:y the 
prosecution responded i i 1 a ma nn e r i nc o n s is t e nt wi t h t he w i t ness1 
subsequent testimony -.r m a " . This inconsistency bears 
appel ] ate : . .. 
convicting the defendant , • rie same prosecutor assurred t::- i ole of 
ccv'oorate counsel ~ y ' ^ - i^-^'^r.^r"' c* r - -" ~1*° ^ r ! n y a r -»-^^oo/ 
t.\ prosecutor ddodi^ _ :.- . • .. . . >.. _•*. i .: 
occupied rcsecutcrial misconduct is a t>js..s for a r.e'A "ria.. 
F : i i , ' = - . * ' ': : • ; • = : ' • -^  
defendant u. scovered that the ti arise :.y *i«- m a . ra^eo ^ 
record the trial in ; ' <- enti^tv. A" 1--;.°;*- ^r^ W I T ^ ^ S ' 
the defendant :\ : :.- u:y verdict w = s inconsistent 
W ] L t j 1 ^Yie e^ ^c^-o ^resented, This te^hmcax malfunction magnifies 
the defendant" s burden incalculably. To avoid prejudicing the 
defendant, this Court should order that the defendant is entitled 
to a new tr"i" . 
ARGUMENT 
I-. "'THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO CARR1 ITS BURDEN OF PROOF 
THAT THE DEFENDANT1 S ACTIONS WERE EITHER INTENTIONAL. OR 
WILLFUL. 
The due process clause of the of the Fifth Amendment in the 
United States Constitution requ ires that the State prove beyond a 
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reasonable doubt every element of the crime with which a 
defendant is accused. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 58 (1970). In the 
present case, even when the evidence is marshaled in support of 
the jury* s verdict and construed most favorably to that verdict, 
the evidence presented at trial is constitutionally deficient to 
support the jury1 s finding. Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant is therefore entitled 
to a new trial on these charges. 
A, Federal case law requires proof of specific intent to 
violate the law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 provides as follows: 
(b) Any person who, with intent evade any tax or 
requirement of Title 5 9 or any lawful requirement of 
the State Tax Commission, fails to make, render, sign, 
or verify any return or to supply any information 
within the time required under this title, or makes, 
renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent 
return or statement, or who supplies any false or 
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree 
felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, 
the fine is not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000. 
c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or 
defeat any tax or payment thereof is, in addition to 
other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second 
degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-
3-301, the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than 
$25,000. 
Section 59-1-401, subsection 9(b) and 9(c) provides substantially 
the same language as 76-8-1101. 
This is a question of first impression in this state. 
There are few, if any, Utah appellate decisions construing the 
statutes under which the defendant has been charged. However, 
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each of the statutes under which the defendant Is charged is 
virtually identical to its federal counterpart Infer-nal Revenue 
Code, Section '; 2U1 and ', 203 provide as follows: 
7201) Any person who willfully attempts in any 
manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title 
or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other 
. penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, 
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 
$100,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both, together with the costs of prosecution. 
72 03) Any person required under this title to pay ai ly 
estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by 
regulations made under authority thereof to make a 
return, keep any records, or supply any information, 
who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, 
make such return, keep such records, or supply such 
information, at the time or times required by law or 
regulations, shall >: addit;i:.: * r other penalties 
provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon 
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 
$25, ( 3C o: imprisoned not: mor* than ' year, or both 
together v.r-i rhe costs of prosecution. 
Because federal cases exist; which construe thes^ statutes tb-^e 
shculu JOG construed v, .*:, respec ' !.'> ; *e elements or uiceM ana 
willfulness *nd aftfc?v anp]v ^ I-H^  federal standard - - "he '^ ase 
c ;!-=*-* _ a. . -.....- : tn prove that the 
defendant acted m a w n ;t;i i intentional manner and that the 
tr: ai -^nr1- "^mrmttied revers:hl~ Frr~r u laiim- • • 
C'- -*..M. jjuestea .:;. .::-:LLiciicr, despite its LtJUxb.ie 
inciusior . rhe parallel federal tax cases. 
Is ' * -- . . 2i p] es 
j ui isp-- uaeiiv. e , Lhe United Si cites Supreme : -i:rr has de*"ei n-: ned, in 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (lSUi; , chat absent proof of 
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specific intent, an individual cannot be criminally liable for a 
failure to abide by this nation's tax laws: 
The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of 
law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted 
in the American legal system, [citations omitted]. Based on 
the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common 
law presumed that every person knew the law. This common law 
rule has been applied by the Court in numerous cases 
construing criminal statutes, [citations omitted]. 
The proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes 
made it difficult for the average citizen to know and 
comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed 
by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the 
impact of the common law presumption by making specific 
intent to violate the law an element of certain federal 
criminal tax offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago 
interpreted the statutory term "willfully" as used in the 
federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception to 
the traditional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax 
offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws. 
In United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933), the Court 
recognized that: "Congress did not intend that a person, by 
reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability 
for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the 
adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a 
criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed 
standard of conduct." Id., at 3 96. 
Thus, an individual may not face criminal liability for any tax 
deficiency that is predicated upon a good faith misunderstanding 
or misplaced reliance, or on the inadequacy of record-keeping as 
in the case at bar. 
B. The only evidence presented at trial demonstrated that 
the defendant relied on tax statements provided to him by 
Neways. 
Leaving aside prejudicial innuendo, the evidence presented 
at trial established only that the defendant relied on the W-2 
and 1099 tax statements prepared for him by Neways. In light of 
the holding in Cheek, this evidence, absent some additional proof 
that he specifically acted to avoid his tax duty, is simply 
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insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was guilty of the crimes as charged. 
Rather than focusing the jury' s attention on the case in chief 
and to the question of whether the defendant acted with specific 
intent to avoid his tax responsibilities, the prosecution opted 
to color the evidence to suggest de facto guilt when none could 
be otherwise proved. In fact, the very first questions to the 
State' s very first witness functioned solely to taint the 
defendant' s presumption of innocence . The prosecution directed 
questions concerning, and Allen Davis testified, that the 
defendant had engaged in discussing the possibility of earning 
income without tax consequences via off-shore banking. Mr. Davis 
conceded at cross-examination, however, that he had no knowledge 
whatsoever of whether the defendant had ever used an off-shore 
corporation for any illegal purpose. (Tr. 80.12-16). In fact, 
Mr. Davis admitted that the defendant had also investigated the 
lawful purposes for which an off-shore corporation could be used. 
(Tr. 80.17-23). But notwithstanding the absence of a crime, the 
State managed to link the defendant' s name to an unsubstantiated 
scheme worthy of tabloid television. 
The State attempted to elicit similar testimony from other 
witnesses with the same result: not one witness could link the 
defendant' s exploration of off-shore banking to tax evasion. In 
fact, the State' s witness, Angela Howell, conceded at cross-
examination that it was her understanding that the defendant' s 
exploration of off-shore banking was done at the behest of the 
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owners of Neways, an international, multi-level marketing 
company, as opposed to a personal venture undertaken by the 
defendant personally. (Tr. 188.7-11). However, regardless of 
the absence of fact, the State' s implication was clear: the 
defendant was guilty de facto of the crimes as charged because he 
was a man who simply didn' t enjoy paying his income taxes and he 
had at least investigated the possibility of earning income tax 
free. The fact is, however, that Mr. Thompson was merely 
performing assignments made to him by his employers with regard 
to exploring off-shore possibilities, and that he himself engaged 
in no off-shore banking or other financial transactions. He, in 
fact, paid substantial taxes in 1996 for a married man with five 
children. 
Divorcing the innuendo from fact, however, results in the 
inescapable conclusion that the defendant failed to act with the 
specific intent required to sustain a conviction for tax evasion. 
In fact, the only sustainable evidence presented at trial was 
that the defendant filed his tax returns based on the information 
provided to him by his employer. Both Annette Jenkins and Craig 
Spencer testified to this fact. And notwithstanding the fact 
that some of the State' s witnesses testified that the defendant 
was upset when he received the original 1099, at least two of 
them testified that by his own account this emotion was tied to 
the fact that the original 1099 which the defendant received was 
not an accurate reflection of his actual income. In fact, the 
State' s witness Annette Jenkins, an accountant for Neways, 
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testified that the defendant never told her that he didn' t want a 
1099 (Tr. 165.23), and that all interested parties understood and 
agreed from the beginning that all such amounts would be properly 
reported on a 1099, rather, he simply voiced displeasure because 
he felt that the 1099 that he received was too high. (Tr. 
166.4). And in fact, when the defendant sat down with Ms. 
Jenkins to review the 1099, she, herself came to the conclusion 
that the 1099 which the defendant received may have been too 
high. (Tr. 166-169) . Subsequent to this meeting, in fact, an 
accountant for Neways did revise the original 10 99 and declared 
under penalty of perjury by signing the companion 1096 form that 
it was in fact an accurate reflection of the defendant' s income. 
Moreover, there was simply no testimony to suggest that the 
defendant did not rely on this 1099 statement. 
The State, however, adopted the position that the defendant 
was not entitled to rely on Neways1 s sworn statements and instead 
focused on phantom checks that may or may not have been included 
in the defendant's 1099's. Notwithstanding the unanimous 
testimony of the State' s own witnesses that the defendant had no 
impact on the amounts that Neways included or excluded in the 
1099s other than making his full records completely available to 
its accountants and owners, the State further gratuitously and 
unilaterally opined that the defendant earned approximately 
$73,000, notwithstanding the testimony by State fact witnesses 
that the defendant earned only $60,000, or a slightly higher 
amount. (Tr. 74.13-22; State's Exhibit 2). Each and every 
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witness produced by the State admitted that he or she did not 
know with any degree of certainty which 1099 tally was correct or 
which amounts should or should not be included therein. Even if 
the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there existed 
under-reported income in the 1099s, in light of Cheek, the 
existence of a tax deficiency alone will not suffice to convict a 
defendant for criminal tax evasion. Simply because the defendant 
(along with Neways' corporate counsel, Neways* accountants, and 
Neways1 independent tax consultant) erroneously calculated his 
income and the tax responsibility stemming from this income, this 
simple error is not criminal unless evidence exists to prove that 
the defendant effected this mistake via a specific criminal 
intent. And absent the unsubstantiated innuendo of unproven 
schemes, no such evidence existed. The jury1 s verdict is 
therefore unsupported by the evidence and the defendant is 
entitled to a new trial on the charges. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IF 
THEY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD IN GOOD FAITH RELIED UPON 
THE TAX STATEMENTS PREPARED BY HIS EMPLOYER THAT THEY COULD 
NOT FIND HIM GUILTY OF INTENTIONAL TAX EVASION. 
Jury Instruction number 5, submitted by the defendant to the 
trial court stated: "If the Defendant had a good faith belief 
that the information received on the 1099 was accurate, you may 
not find for him guilty." The defendant cited Cheek, supra, in 
support of this instruction under the theory that the defendant 
was entitled to rely on the final 1099 because it was prepared by 
Neways' accountants and that such reliance would negate the 
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element of specific intent. Nevertheless, the trial court 
refused to instruct the jury accordingly. This decision goes 
against the weight of federal law. At least five federal 
appellate circuits have concluded that the failure to give 
instructions with respect to a defendant' s good faith reliance on 
an accountant or other expert constitutes reversible error where 
some evidence existed to support such a defense. United States 
v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Mitchell, 495 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Piatt, 
435 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1970); Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 
976 (5th Cir. 1968); and United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435 
(7th Cir. 1954) . Moreover, these circuits have held that this 
instruction must be given explicitly and may not simply be 
implied by the culmination of other similar instructions. 
Mitchell at 288, Bursten at 981-82. 
In the present case, evidence was presented to the trial 
court that the defendant relied on the statements of Neways and 
the professionals it employed to prepare the W-2 and 1099 
documents. The original 1099 submitted to the defendant by his 
employer was prepared under penalty of perjury by the accountant 
and agent of the employer. The defendant believed that the 10 99 
included income which was not legally attributable to him and 
asked that it be revised to accurately reflect his taxable 
income. The defendant's request resulted in his employer 
revising the 1099 upon which he relied to prepare his tax return. 
The plaintiff included in his tax return every last cent of the 
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income attributable to him by his employer on the 1099. The 
defendant's reliance upon th 1099 completely negates the required 
element of specific intent. Because the court failed to instruct 
the jury as requested by the defendant with respect to this 
element of the crime, the defendant is entitled to a new trial to 
allow a jury to properly determine this issue. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO GRANT THE 
DEFENDANT' S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
as follows: 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest 
of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party. 
At trial, the State utilized perjured testimony to establish 
the foundation for the ledger allegedly created by the defendant 
which became the State's first exhibit. In fact, the State had 
such difficulty having the document admitted into evidence 
because the original was stolen from the defendant' s personal 
belongings and an altered photocopy was proffered in its place. 
This testimony worked a substantial prejudice on the defendant' s 
rights. Walker v. State of Utah, 624 P.2d 687. See, 38 ALR3d 
1313. 
At trial Allen Davis testified that he received the ledger 
which became the State' s first exhibit from his secretary in 
approximately February of 1997. When challenged on voir dire 
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regarding the presence of journal entries on the face of the 
document purporting to extend beyond the claimed date of 
acquisition, Mr. Davis changed his testimony that he had actually 
taken the exhibit himself from the defendant' s personal 
possessions on or about July 1, 1997, at the time of the 
defendant' s termination from Neways. Either of Davis' s versions 
of his testimony was a departure from the representation that the 
prosecutor made to defense counsel immediately prior to trial in 
which the prosecutor stated that Mr. Davis had obtained the 
journal from the defendant' s wife. When Davis, who had been 
excluded from the courtroom prior to his testimony, saw that the 
defendant' s wife was present in the courtroom, he changed the 
story he had agreed to tell on the witness stand regarding how he 
had obtained Exhibit No. 1. This apparent collusion between the 
two is particularly troubling in light of the fact that 
subsequent to the defendant' s conviction, the prosecutor himself 
became employed by Neways in a position subordinate to the 
witness. 
Mr. Davis' s presence throughout this case is substantially 
marked by subtle manipulation of fact and witnesses and general 
skullduggery. In addition to the above-described acts, Mr. Davis 
is known on the record to have acted in the following 
questionable or inappropriate ways: 
a) he is believed by Ned Shimizu to be the person who 
sent out anonymous accusations against the defendant 
although he refused to admit it to investigators; 
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i) materials contained in the anonymous accusation 
"packet" contained materials burglarized from the 
Thompson home; 
ii) additional accusations of wrongdoing in the 
anonymous packet included stories of bilking 
investors out of millions in off-shore schemes, 
non-payment of child support, the adoption of 
false identities with false documentation to 
match, etc.; 
b) although he claimed to be a close friend of the 
defendant he voluntarily and vociferously offered 
gratuitous, inflammatory testimony about Mr. 
Thompson' s supposed conversations with him and 
admissions to him, many of which are denied by other 
witnesses or are impossible in their application; 
i) for example, Mr. Davis testified that the 
defendant admitted to him that he asked Annette 
Jenkins to zero out the 1099, yet Ms. Jenkins 
denies that Mr. Thompson ever made such a request; 
ii) another example is that all of the off-shore 
tax evasion schemes that Davis claimed that Mr. 
Thompson had discussed with him are impossible in 
application because they necessarily require the 
involvement of Neways and its owners in unlawful 
off-shore transactions with them; 
c) Davis worked behind the scenes to ensure that no one 
at Neways communicated with Mr. Thompson regarding the 
status of the 1099s and the process of determining what 
was or was not appropriate, as evidenced by his secret 
memoranda; 
d) despite Davis' s extravagant claims about Mr. 
Thompson' s off-shore tax schemes, even Davis admitted 
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that there is no evidence of any such tax evasion 
transactions; 
e) despite Davis' s claim about Mr. Thompson' s 
assertions that counsel at Neways need not pay taxes, 
Mr. Thompson was not accused of tax evasion for the tax 
years 1993, 1994, and 1995, even though Ned Shimizu 
investigated those years, and he paid nearly $8,000 in 
taxes on his 1996 income, with a wife and five children 
in his household; and 
f) despite Davis' s claims about Mr. Thompson' s stated 
compulsion to reduce his tax liabilities at any cost, 
every State witness testified that Mr. Thompson only 
requested that his 1099 accurately reflect his true 
income and that he did not attempt to influence the 
outcome of any determination. 
The.apparent collusion between Davis and the prosecutor 
Wade Winegar is especially evident in light of the fact that both 
knew at the time of trial that the reason the original checks 
were not available for the trial of this matter is that all of 
the Neways original checks were in the possession of the Internal 
Revenue Service' s criminal investigators, and that Mr. Thompson 
was not the target of that investigation, but was indeed, a 
witness in that criminal investigation. The fact that Mr. 
Winegar knew at that time that Neways, its owners, and its 
attorney, Allen Davis, were being investigated for federal tax 
crimes, and that Mr. Thompson was a witness therein, is 
compounded with complicity in light of Mr. Winegar' s acceptance 
of Mr. Thompson' s former position as corporate counsel for Neways 
within mere weeks of Mr. Thompson' s incarceration for his 
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conviction herein. 
Indeed, the prosecutor' s misrepresentations to counsel and 
the court, and his willful use of what he knew to be perjured 
testimony by Mr. Davis constituted misconduct and worked a 
substantial prejudice on the defendant's rights. 
IV, THE MALFUNCTION OF THE COURT' S VIDEOTAPE WORKS A 
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE ON THE DEFENDANT AS IT RELATES TO 
HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT THE VERDICT 
CONTRADICTED THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Subsequent to filing this appeal, the defendant learned that 
the Court' s videotape equipment had malfunctioned and had failed 
to record the testimony of at least one witness for the State. 
This witness was an individual named Karin Lane who, as an 
employee of Neways, served as the custodian of the financial 
records used as evidence against the defendant. Obviously, Ms. 
Lane was called to lay the foundation for the admission of these 
records into evidence. However, the parties have been unable to 
recreate either a record of her testimony or of the objections 
thereto. Ms. Lane was the State's second witness and her 
testimony required the remainder of the first day of trial after 
the first witness was dismissed. 
Subsequent to the defendant filing this appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court handed down a ruling which addresses this scenario. 
In State v. Tunzi, 2000 UT 38 (Utah 2000), the Court stated that 
because attempts to reconstruct a record often impair a 
defendant' s rights on appeal, it is preferable to simply order a 
28 
new trial: "The burdens and futility associated with 
reconstructing a record are increased exponentially when the 
issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a conviction, as it does here. Therefore to avoid 
needless burdens and delay, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand this case to the trial court for a new trial." 
In the present case, as in Tunzi, the defendant has appealed 
his conviction on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient 
to support such conviction. However, because the transcript does 
not reflect the full extent of the testimony offered against him 
or on his behalf, the defendant1 s burden has increased 
immeasurably. This matter is already 2.5 years after the trial 
herein, and there is still an incomplete record on which to base 
an appeal. To avoid further unconstitutionally prejudicing the 
defendant's right to appeal, this Court should order a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal case law construing statutes identical to those 
changed in the present case a very narrowly selected net. The 
over arching intent of the criminal tax law is to convict only 
those defendants who "intentionally" violate its terms. 
The common thread of all of the defendant's conduct whether 
one agrees with the specifics or not was to account (the 
journal) and report (the 1099's) all of his income. Even if one 
argues that minor errors were made in the process (which the 
defendant denies) the case before the Court falls woefully short 
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of the specific intent required by the controlling precedent. 
A new trial becomes even more of an imperative when all of 
the transcript of the trial is not available to judge the 
plaintiff s conduct. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ( day of August, 2001. 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE 
DAVID 0. BLACK 
Attorney for 
Defendant and Appellant 
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Neways was to work for? 
A Before I was even given the offer, we started 
talking extensively about Neways. I wanted to know what 
it was like, what kind of a company it was and I asked 
lots of questions. 
Q Did he ever talk about tax implications with 
your employment at Neways? 
A As I was considering the—the opportunity, he 
mentioned that one of the advantages of working at Neways 
would be that I would be able to earn all of my income 
tax-free. 
Q How did he explain you were going to be able to 
do that? 
A He described a method where he would organize a 
corporation off-shore somewhere, that we would—he and I 
would become employees of that corporation and that the 
corporation would simply provide legal services to 
Neways. They would be paid by Neways and then the 
corporation would pay us. 
Q Where was this corporation to be located? 
A His off-shore location that he mentioned was 
the British Virgin Islands. 
Q Did he ever talk about how you were going to 
get the money back into the United States? 
A He said there were quite a few ways to repay-
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trade the money both legally and illegally, that there 
were plenty of legal ways to repay-trade it. And I 
didn't get into—to that specifically with him, but he 
did mention there were a lot of legal ways to bring it 
back in. 
Q Did he ever talk about not raising red flags? 
A Later, after I'd accepted employment there, we 
talked about some other methods of—of bringing money in 
and he mentioned that one method would be to get a credit 
card from a—an off-shore bank and then use an ATM and 
that you could bring in a lot of cash, it wouldn't raise 
any red flags, that it wouldn't be traceable. 
Q Did he say it wouldn't be traceable to any 
specific organization? 
A He said— 
MR. BLACK: Objection. Leading, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Hearsay. Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you know if any of these 
off-shore corporations were ever created? 
A James created several off-shore corporations. 
Q Did he ever discuss his employment compensation 
at Neways during the time that he was working there? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q What did he tell you about that? 
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A He told me that he—he had negotiated a deal 
with Dee Mower, one of the owners, and that he would 
receive a base salary of approximately $20,000, I'm not 
even sure exactly how much it was, that the remainder of 
his income was paid by him receiving checks made out 
directly to people he owed money to. 
Q Did he tell you why he wanted to do it this 
way? 
A I—I believe that he did* He mentioned—we—we 
talked a lot about it. A couple of different times, he 
talked about the fact that he could avoid paying child 
support, that was, I believe the number one reason. 
Q I think before, you also mentioned that he 
didn't have to pay taxes on that; was he referring 
specifically to this scheme when he mentioned that? 
A When he talked about how having to pay taxes, 
it was before we were employed, he talked about it, 
saying that—before I was employed there, that I could— 
could work there tax-free. 
After I was employed there and before I 
received my first check, he put a lot of pressure on me 
to set up a similar scheme to his, claiming that it would 
be a way I could avoid taxes. I refused. And he kept 
pushing me and finally, I said, I—I want to buy a house 
and if I only accept $20,000 of income, then I wouldn't 
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A I—I don't recall specifically. It would have 
been the last week of June or the first week of July of 
last year. 
Q And so it's your testimony then that you saw 
this journal on at least two different occasions? 
A Yes. 
Q Was—is it your testimony that you saw this 
initially when you came to work for Neways in the end of 
1996? 
A The first time I saw it was in February, 
January or February of 1996. 
Q And then— 
A I mean 1997. 
Q —when did you—did you see it again then when 
you photocopied it— 
A Yes. 
Q —in 1997? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it the same journal? 
A Yes. 
Q As far as you could tell, had he added 
additional entries between when you first saw it and saw 
it the end of the month? 
A Yes. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, our 
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James to finish up the—the embezzlement investigation 
while I was gone. 
When I came back, he had finished the 
investigation, we began talking and he mentioned that 
people might assume or might accuse him of being involved 
in the embezzlement. He wanted to convince me that he 
was completely legitimate, that he was only taking the 
amount of money that was—that was due him as income. 
And he showed me the journal and he explained 
exactly how he set it up and why he set it up. 
Q I/m going to— 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, if I may 
use some exhibits, an enlarged photocopy of that, for the 
jury's benefit. 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Did he explain on the first 
page of that exhibit what the calculation was at the very 
top of the page? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q What did—what did he explain to you? 
A He explained that the 75 represented the 
$75,000 salary, 26 represented the 26 pay periods, that 
2,884.61 represented the division of 75,000 divided by 26 
pay periods and that that resulted in his credits each 
pay period of $1,358.47. 
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Q Now, the 769.23, do you know what that figure 
would have been? 
A He explained it to me and I don't remember 
right now—oh, yes, I do now. 
He explained that that's the amount that he was 
being paid through A-Plus Benefits, our—the company that 
issues our—our pay checks. 
Q Did he, as far as you could tell, did he make 
credits then for that amount every two weeks? 
A Yes. He—he explained to me that that's 
specifically how he did it, with the—with each credit, 
that that was the amount that he was due, over and above 
his pay check. And that he would credit his account that 
amount and then he would deduct for whatever checks were 
taken out and kept a running balance over in the right-
hand column. 
Q Did he tell you why he set his salary at 
$21,000? 
A He didn't—didn't say specifically why, no. He 
did say that he— 
MR. BLACK: Objection. There's no 
question pending, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) What did he—what did he say? 
A He said that he wanted to have it a low enough 
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number that he wouldn't pay a lot of child support. 
MR. WINEGAR: May I approach, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) I'm going to show you what 
has been marked as State's Exhibit 2. Do you recognize 
that document? 
A Yes. I do. 
Q Who's the custodian of that document? 
A It's a—it's a Neways document and the 
custodian of the employee records would probably be 
Jeannie McNeal, who's the head of our human resources 
department, somebody with whom I work regularly. 
Q Do you have a file concerning the defendant? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have a copy of that in your file? 
A Yes. We did. 
Q Can you tell me what it is? 
A It's an employment contract. 
Q And who is the contract with? 
A It's between Neways, Inc. and James Thompson. 
Q Does it set a—a salary as to how much he will 
be paid on an annual— 
MR. BLACK: Objection. He's asking 
the witness to testify to the exhibit before it's been 
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entered into the file, but is he the custodian right now 
as of this date and he states that he is. 
THE COURT: Objection's overruled. 
We'll receive Exhibit S-2. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Were you ever a neighbor of 
the defendant? 
A Yes. 
Q When did he become your neighbor? 
A After—after I was hired by Neways, I started 
in—on November 18th and I actually lived with James for 
a couple of weeks while I found a place and I found a—an 
apartment that was just—it was probably three or four 
blocks away from his house. And we moved into that 
December 2nd. 
Q Do you know who his landlord was? 
A Dan Fish. 
Q Are you aware if Neways ever made payments to 
Dan Fish? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know if they were for legal consulting? 
A They were not. 
Q Do you know what they were for? 
A Yes. 
Q What? 
A James' rent. 
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Q Did Mr. ever—did Mr. Thompson ever talk to you 
about renting versus buying capital assets, like cars or 
anything? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he tell you about that? 
A For a variety of reasons, he encouraged me not 
to own any assets, that—to lease as much as I possibly 
could to avoid judgments being assessed against those 
assets. 
Q Do you know who Liza Edsberg is? 
A Yes. 
Q Who is she? 
A His wife. 
Q Do you know if she ever worked for Neways? 
MR. BLACK: Objection, your Honor, I-
-the scope—the question is vague and ambiguous. This 
witness worked only a month-and-a-half of the time period 
of 1996 and the—the question does not narrow the scope 
down, so we don't know where his information comes from. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He can 
answer. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I've 
forgotten— 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you know if Liza Edsberg 
ever worked for Neways? 
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Q Did Mr. ever—did Mr. Thompson ever talk to you 
about renting versus buying capital assets, like cars or 
anything? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he tell you about• that? 
A For a variety of reasons, he encouraged me not 
to own any assets, that—to lease as much as I possibly 
could to avoid judgments being assessed against those 
assets. 
Q Do you know who Liza Edsberg is? 
A Yes. 
Q Who is she? 
A His wife. 
Q Do you know if she ever worked for Neways? 
MR. BLACK: Objection, your Honor, I-
-the scope—the question is vague and ambiguous. This 
witness worked only a month-and-a-half of the time period 
of 1996 and the—the question does not narrow the scope 
down, so we don't know where his information comes from. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He can 
answer. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I've 
forgotten— 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you know if Liza Edsberg 
ever worked for Neways? 
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A Yes. She did. 
Q When did she work for them? 
A I am not sure when she started. When I was em-
-when I first became employed there, she was performing 
certain work for Neways. 
Q What type of work? 
A She and James were cooperating to open Denmark 
as a new market for Neways. 
Q What—are you aware of what work she actually 
did to try to open Denmark? 
A I am not. 
Q Do you know if she made any phone calls? 
A Not that I'm aware of, not while I was there. 
Q Explain to me what opening a country means. 
A There—there are essentially two processes that 
are involved in opening a country; first, it—it requires 
certain filings with that country, making sure that the— 
that the company is legal to do business there and then 
that the products are legally sold there. And then 
secondly, it requires building a group of distributors 
that can market and sell the product. 
THE COURT: Mr. Winegar, why don't 
you ask just for my benefit and perhaps the jury's, what 
it is that Neways does. 
MR. WINEGAR: Good question, your 
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MR. BLACK: Objection. Foundation. 
THE COURT: Oh. He can answer. 
THE WITNESS: Usually, only a 
reimbursement for expenses. It's traditionally not 
income for that. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Have you been asked to 
investigate whether Liza Edsberg ever was able to receive 
income for her work in trying to open Denmark? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you find? 
A I found no evidence of—of any filings with any 
of the foreign countries and I found no evidence of any 
translations. 
I was told by many people that there were 
translations and that—that things were done, but I've 
never been able to find any evidence of it. 
THE COURT: Let's wait until he asks 
questions, okay, Mr. Davis? 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Sorry. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Are you aware if the 
defendant received a 1099 from Neways? 
A Yes. 
Q How do you know that? 
A It was done at my direction. 
Q Did he ever make a comment to you about having 
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to need to fire one of the other accountants, a guy by 
the name of Craig. I asked him if Craig was involved and 
he said no, but I'll explain it when we—when you get 
back. 
When I arrived back in Utah, we talked about it 
and he said that because of Craig's disloyalty, and I 
never really completely understood that Craig needed to 
be fired, but that Annette had—had come clean and had 
admitted her embezzlement and that he thought she would 
be a good employee from here on out. 
Q But he wanted Craig Spencer fired? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Is Craig Spencer the one that had issued the 
1099? 
A Yes. He was. 
Q Did the defendant tell you that he had asked 
Annette Jenkins to zero out the 1099? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q Was this the same Annette Jenkins that had been 
caught embezzling the money? 
A Yes. It was. 
Q Do you know if the original 1099 was ever 
modified and a new one issued in its place? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know how much that was for? 
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-I I A Yes. Neways owned it. 
2 Q Do you know if his wife was able to even drive? 
3 A When I first started, she didn't have a 
4 driver's license, but subsequently she obtained one. 
5 Q Was that the only vehicle that they had? 
A Yes. It was. 
7 I Q Do you know if he used that for personal use as 
well as business use? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q When the vehicle was returned, how many miles 
did it have on it? 
A Almost 60,000. 
Q And who paid for the vehicle? 
A Neways. 
Q Do you know who paid for the gas for the 
vehicle? 
A James did. 
Q Do you know if he was ever reimbursed for the 
gas he put in the vehicle? 
A Sometimes, yes. 
Q And who reimbursed him for that? 
A Neways. 
Q Do you know if a 1099 was ever issued for his 
personal use on the vehicle? 
A It was not. 
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A 
himself. 
Q 
A 
it. 
Q 
For himself? I—I know that he set up one for 
What was the name of the corporation? 
It's an Italian name, and I cannot pronounce 
Okay. When did he set it up? 
A I don't know. It was before I came to Neways. 
Q Okay. Have you ever seen any evidence of it? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Where was it set up? 
A In the British Virgin Islands. 
Q Did he ever run any money through it? 
A Not that I'm aware of. 
Q So he never used it that you're aware of for 
any tax avoidance purposes? 
A Not that I'm aware of. 
Q And in fact, I think you testified, didn't you, 
that if he did that, he could bring money in legally, 
didn't he? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And that was his intent if he had used such an 
organization? 
A He told me that you could bring it in legally. 
Q Yes. And you don't have any reason to believe 
that he didn't intend to bring it in legally, do you? 
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Q Is that what one of the—his duties were? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now, have you had a chance to talk to 
Annette Jenkins about this statement that you allege that 
Mr. Thompson told you that he asked her to zero out his 
1099? 
A Yes. I have. 
Q Okay. When did you talk to her about it? 
A I've talked to her about it a couple of times, 
but it was some time ago. I haven't talked to her for 
awhile. 
Q Okay. When would you say was the first time 
you talked to her about it? 
A I—I couldn't even guess. 
Q And did—and—and is it your testimony that she 
told you that Mr. Thompson told her that he wanted to 
zero out his tax— 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I would 
object as calling for hearsay, what some other witness 
that will testify later said to the witness. 
THE COURT: Well, she'll be available 
for cross, so the objection's overruled. 
THE WITNESS: She said that James 
never asked her to—to zero out the accounts nor had Dee. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Okay. So, why do you think 
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Spencer about whether or not he thought it should be 
1099'ed? 
A Yes. 
Q In fact, he did think it should have been 
1099'ed; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And he had thought that from the very 
beginning? 
A That it should be, yes. 
Q And he had always intended to— 
A No. 
Q —1099 it? 
A No. 
Q Okay. You're aware that money was taken out of 
Mr. Thompson's check each—each pay day for his personal 
use and the landlord, weren't you? 
A No. I was not aware of that. 
Q Have you ever investigated in his checks? 
A No. I have not. 
Q Sir, you've testified that you advised Mrs. 
Mower—let me get this straight—that 1099's should be 
prepared upon Mr. Thompson's 1996 income? 
A Correct. 
Q Would you please turn to Page 86 of that 
transcript from the preliminary hearing in this matter? 
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A I do not. 
Q And next question, Line 25. 
Okay. And you don't know any more information 
than—you don't know what information that she had? 
ANSWER: I don't know what information she had. 
And you didn't, did you? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. So you were guessing when you said you 
thought it was inaccurate, weren't you? 
A No. 
Q You didn't find out what information that she 
had that she thought it was accurate from, did you? 
A Nope. 
Q Now, Mr. Thompson worked for Mr. Mower 
individually, didn't he? 
A He did work for Mr. Mower. 
Q Did some legal work for him individually? 
A Correct. 
Q And he did work for Tom Mower, Jr., 
individually, on occasion, too, didn't he? 
A Correct. 
Q And Dee Mower, individually? 
A Correct. 
Q Was he paid for that? 
A Yes. From Neways. 
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A I did not. 
Q And the reason you didn't is because you talked 
to Dee Mower, one of the co-owners of Neways, about it, 
didn't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And she said that she thought that the two 
final 1099's submitted to James and Liza were accurate, 
didn't she? 
A No, she didn't. 
Q Would you please turn to Page 86? Excuse me, 
87. My question to you, this is your testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, Line 16, my question: 
Did—did you advise your client that—that the-
-that the 1099 was not accurate? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
Okay. We're on the same page so far. 
And who did you advise? 
ANSWER: Dee Mower. 
Okay. And did she say she thought it was 
accurate? 
ANSWER: She said based upon information she 
had it was accurate. 
Is that what she said? 
A Yes. 
Q You don't disclaim that testimony? 
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MR. WINEGAR: Thank you, Mr. Davis. 
THE COURT: All right. We will take 
a ten-minute recess now. 
We sticking anywhere near with the schedule 
that you've anticipated so far? 
MR. WINEGAR: I think we're doing 
quite well, your Honor. We have an additional witness or 
two we can put on; Karin Lane— 
THE COURT: Well, it's up to you, but 
I'm glad to hear we're on schedule. 
MR. WINEGAR: Okay. 
(Recess.) 
(The remainder of the hearing on this day was 
not recorded.) 
* * * 
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examination. He can—he can repeat to a certain extent. 
THE WITNESS: Will you restate that? 
Q (By Mr. Black) As you were correcting the 
document, wouldn't one of the things that you would do to 
correct the document, to make sure you got it right is go 
talk to the person who either had or didn't have the 
income so that he could verify it to you? 
A It would make sense. 
Q But you didn't do it? 
A I didn't do it. I was asked not to talk to Mr. 
Thompson by Mrs. Mower. 
Q Okay. Do you believe that was fair to Mr. 
Thompson? 
A That what was fair? 
Q Not asking him what should have been on the 
return, what his thoughts were about what should have 
been on the return? 
A I—once again, I was told by Mrs, Mower that he 
had requested not to talk to me. He didn't—at that 
time, he—I was under the impression that he wanted to 
work it out without him being involved and that he was 
going to work through Mrs. Mower. 
Q Okay. Would you pick up Exhibit No. 20, 
please? 
A What does it look like? 
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Q Where he made check requests? 
A The—went through his legal assistants once 
again. 
Q Yeah. 
A I don't remember seeing but maybe ten check 
requests that he filled out himself. 
Q Could have been ten check requests that he did 
that weren't for—that were for third parties, not for 
him; is that correct? 
A Right. 
MR. BLACK: May I approach the 
witness, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Calling your attention to 
Exhibit 6, the check request form that's to Zions Bank, 
payee, address, S.F., amount $3,500; do you see that? 
A I do. 
Q Have you ever seen it before? 
A I'm sure I have. 
Q Now, that's requested by James, isn't it? 
A It is. 
Q Does it have a description on it? 
A No. 
Q You don't have any idea whether that was for 
James or—or some other Neways purchase, do you? 
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A Do I—I have an idea that it would be for James 
because no description was placed on the line. If it was 
a business-related expenses, it's a policy that a 
description should be placed there. 
Q Okay. 
A It—it could have been for business-related, 
too. 
Q Could have been for business? 
A It could have, yes. 
Q As a matter of fact, you had an inkling it 
might have been for business when you prepared Exhibit 
No. 21; isn't that correct? 
A It doesn't appear that it's on here, so that 
must have been correct. 
Q Exhibit No. 21, would you go to the very bottom 
entry? 
A Oh. The very bottom. Okay. 
Q And—and next to it, you have traveler's checks 
question mark, for what? 
A Right. 
Q So you didn't know what it was for, did you? 
A No. I knew that it—I was told that he—he was 
purchasing travelers checks for it at that time. 
Q Okay. And— 
A I didn't know where he was traveling, I didn't 
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know. We hadn't—I don't believe that we had filled out 
a—a travel advance for that, so I—I was under the 
impression that it more than likely wasn't for a 
business-related travel expense. 
Q You don't remember being told they were to 
purchase travelers checks to open up accounts for Neways 
and its related entities in the British Virgin Islands? 
A I was aware that that's where he had traveled 
to, but I wasn't aware that—for sure that it was for 
Neways or other clientele that he may have had, 
Q And you weren't aware that it wasn't, either, 
were you? 
A Right. 
Q And as a matter of fact, that—that description 
is a little bit out of—that check request is a little 
bit out of the ordinary, isn't it? Would you go to the— 
the next one, it'll just say Aloha Islanders for $200— 
A Okay• 
Q —description Re: James Thompson? 
A Right. 
Q So and that was, in your opinion, for James 
Thompson's personal income; isn't that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, the—the first two, 4-26-96 to Zions Bank, 
$610, Re: James Thompson? 
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1 A Which two? I'm sorry, 
2 Q The first two. 
3 A Okay. 
4 Q That's under the description? 
5 A Regarding James Thompson, yes. 
g Q And that was actually as you talked about 
7 before, requested by Annette if it was going to be— 
8 generally you testified if it was going to be for his 
g income, it was requested by Annette; isn't that correct? 
A Normally, yes. 
Q And that—the 5-22-96 check request for James 
2^ Thompson for $500? 
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A There—$500, yes, I believe there's a few 
14 (inaudible) 500? 
Q Yes. 
A Okay. 
Q Again, under the description it says, James, 
1Q requested by Annette? 
A Right. 
Q That's consistent with how it would have 
ordinarily been done; isn't that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And so you—you're fairly certain that that 
Zions $3,500 is out of the ordinary course and not how it 
was usually done since it didn't put a description down; 
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aren't you? 
A I'm fairly certain it was out of the course. 
Q Okay. 
A I should have received receipts for those and 
never did. 
Q And you don't know— 
A Right. 
Q —what—what they went for? 
A Right. 
Q And you never asked Mr. Thompson what they went 
for, did you? 
A At that time, I believe I'd asked for receipts, 
sent memos out to everyone who was traveling for the 
company, asking for receipts; but specifically on that 
check request, no. 
Q Okay. So, you included that $3,500 in the 
1099, didn't you? 
A I would assume I did. Without a 10-key to add 
this up, I'd have to assume that I did. 
Q May I give the witness a calculator? 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I guess I 
would object as being vague. Which 1099 is he referring 
to, the first one or the second? 
MR. BLACK: Thank you very much, 
Counsel. The—the second one. And I appreciate that 
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correction. 
key, 
that 
Q 
but-
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
went 
(By Mr. Black) This is not 
This might take me a little 
— I hope it works. 
Almost there. 
Yeah. It was included. 
Okay. So, as you sit here 
through the re—the reports 
whether it should or should not have 
you can't testify for sure even now, 
. an accountant's 
bit. 
today as 
10-
• the person 
to determine 
been re-
whether 
-included 
that was 
l, 
for 
Mr. Thompson's personal b e n e f i t , or i f i t was for a 
Neways' expense , can you? 
A No. I c a n ' t . 
MR. BLACK: May I approach the 
witness and get my calculator? 
Q (By Mr. Black) Let's look—let's look at 
Exhibit No. 20. 
A Okay. 
Q Now, that's a—I think you testified at the 
preliminary hearing, that was a—kind of an intermediate 
document? 
A Right. It was one that I had prepared and 
given to Dee to discuss with James and Dee had made the 
notation from the conversation with James on what was 
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indeed not—was business-related or what the description 
of it was. 
Q Okay. 
A And then we made changes from there. 
Q So, there's some handwriting on the right-hand 
column? 
A Right. 
Q And it's your testimony that that's Dee's? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And did you act on the instructions that 
are set out in the right-hand column? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. And for example, $2,000, says off-shore 
for Pacific Consulting Trust. 
A Right. 
Q And you therefore, did you take that out of— 
did you not put that in the 1099 then? 
A I did not. It was expensed to international 
consulting fees. 
Q And that was as a result of what Dee told you? 
A Right. 
Q And you never—you didn't have any question 
about that, did you? 
A Not what—other than I still had not received 
an invoice for it. 
368 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, we talked a 
little bit before about calling Ned Shimizu back for the 
limited purpose of getting this summary in and that's all 
we have left. 
NEP SHIMIZU, 
recalled as a witness by and on behalf of the State in 
this matter, after having been previously duly sworn, 
assumed the witness stand and was examined and testified 
further as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, WINEGAR: 
Q If you can remember you're still under oath. 
A Yeah. 
Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as 
State's Exhibit 18. Can you—we talked a little bit 
about this yesterday. Can you tell me again what this 
document is? 
A This document just compiles the information 
that we obtained from Neways. Has columns for the check 
dates, check numbers, the payee on the check, the amount 
of the check, whether or not we had a check request from 
Neways, whether or not we had a cancelled check. It also 
compares to Mr. Thompson's journal here, that we had a 
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copy of, and then the document that Mr, Spencer prepared, 
the general ledger is the document that Mr. Spencer 
prepared. 
Q Okay* When you state general ledger, are you 
referring to Exhibit 23—excuse me, 21, which is—let roe 
show you that? Is that what you're referring to when you 
talk about the general ledger? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you believe that this accurately summarizes 
the evidence that's been admitted into Court today? 
A I do. 
Q Now, as you go across each little line, you 
have X's in boxes above what you call check request 
forms, the checks; does that indicate whether a document 
that's been admitted into evidence shows that particular 
transaction? For example, American Express or Aloha 
Islanders? 
MR. BLACK: Objection, foundation. 
This witness isn't—I don't think—there's not foundation 
that he knows what documents have been admitted into 
evidence, your Honor. 
MR. WINEGAR: He's the case agent, 
your Honor. He's been here the entire time. 
THE COURT: Right. He can answer. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Can you—can you 
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repeat the question, please? 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) As you go across each 
transaction, for example, you've got the top transaction 
there, I think is International Business Service. 
A Right. 
Q As you go across, do the X's in the boxes below 
where, for example it says "journal" or "check request" 
or "check", does that show whether there is a document 
that reflects? 
A Yeah, that's—that's what it does. 
Q Okay. 
A It shows where we corroborated the evidence. 
Like, for instance, the first check was the journal of 
Mr. Thompson. The other—the other boxes weren't 
checked. 
MR. WINEGAR: I would—I would move 
that State's Exhibit 18 be admitted into evidence, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Black? 
MR. BLACK: Your Honor, I only object 
so far as the comments in the summaries which do not— 
which are basically commenting on the evidence rather 
than summarizing the evidence. If—if the comments and 
summaries aspect—and may I bring that to the Court to— 
THE COURT: I don't have a copy, so 
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I'd appreciate that. 
You're talking about the last column; right? 
MR. BLACK: The last two columns. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BLACK: Comments and—and 
summaries, I—I submit that the summaries is comments— 
are comments as well and— 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask Mr. 
Shimizu. What is the source of the words or numbers 
found in the column labeled "comments"? You'll notice it 
says, the top one says a "four-plex". 
THE WITNESS: Right. On—on the back 
of that particular check or on the document, there was 
something to notate—notate a four-plex rent. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything 
in that column that doesn't come straight off the back of 
a check? 
THE WITNESS: No, there isn't. 
THE COURT: Okay. How about the last 
column, "summaries"? 
MR. BLACK: May I—may I ask one 
other question with regard to that? 
Is there— 
THE COURT: When he finishes 
answering my question. 
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A It was a check from the corporation with whom 
he worked. I think it was Neways. 
Q Is it unusual to get a check from a renter from 
someone else? 
MR. BLACK: Ob—obj—never mind. 
Excuse me. 
THE WITNESS: I thought it was a 
little different. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Did you get another check for 
a month's rent that also included half of the security 
deposit, for 1,950? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you ever talk to the respondent about the 
rent and how it would be classified? 
A Not directly. I mean, we—I just assumed that 
it was rent and that his company was paying his rent. 
Q Did he ever talk to you about consulting, legal 
consulting? 
A He may have mentioned something about 
consulting fees; however, the intent of the check was for 
rent. 
Q What did he say about consulting fees? 
A I really don't remember. He—he made some 
comment about consulting fees and I said, You can call it 
what you want, it's rent, to me. 
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MR. WINEGAR: State would offer 
State's Exhibit 15 into evidence. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. BLACK: There's a—there's a 
letter that's at the back of it that the witness has not 
identified. I don't think it's material or relevant to 
the—the document, either; so I don't object to the 
lease, but I object to the—the additional document 
that's involved in the lease. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Could you look at the last 
page of that? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell me what that is? 
A It's basically term—he was telling me that he 
was terminating—getting prepared to move and terminating 
the—the contract. 
Q Is that a letter that he sent to you? 
A Yes. It is. 
Q Is that part of the file that you have on his 
lease? 
A It is. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, we would 
ask that the entire exhibit be admitted. 
MR. BLACK: I withdraw that objection 
without foundation# your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Okay. S-15's received. 
MR. WINEGAR: I have no further 
questions of this witness. 
MR. BLACK: May I have 30 seconds to 
consult with my client? 
THE COURT: You may. 
CRQS3-EXAHINATION 
BY MR. BLACK: 
Q Mr. Fish, you talked with Mr. Thompson when you 
found out he was a lawyer, about the possibility of maybe 
exchanging some consulting with him possibly doing some 
real—some legal work with regard to your real estate 
business; is that correct? 
A Yeah. He talked to me, if I had some good 
transactions, that we—we could explore that in the 
future. 
Q And that was the nature of the—for the 
consulting talks, wasn't it? 
A I—I don't consider that consulting. I mean, 
we just talked about if he had possible transactions in 
the future, I'd be interested in it. If the company had-
-if his company had interest in buying real estate, I'd 
be interested in— 
Q Okay. 
A —doing that type of work. 
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Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you know if the defendant 
worked at Neways the end of 1995? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you process payroll records for him? 
A I did. 
Q How much did his initial salary start out at? 
A I believe it was around 80,000 a year. 
Q How long did that go? 
A I—I have forgotten right—that went on for 
probably about four months. 
Q What happened then? 
A I was given paperwork by Dee that lowered his 
salary, his annual salary. 
Q What did it lower it to? 
A In the 21,000 a year range. 
Q Do you know why it was lowered? 
A At the time, I—I didn't know, but later on 
that day, I was told that he was going to do some other 
work and that we were going to pay him through accounts 
payable— 
Q -Is that unusual— 
A —for that other work. 
Q Is that unusual to pay someone through accounts 
payable? 
A It is. Usually you just do that with the 
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-j employee and that he was hurting Neways and that his best 
, interest wasn't with Tom and Dee. 
3 I Q tfas this just after he received the 1099? 
4 i A It was. 
5 Q Did the defendant ever ask you to take care of 
6 , the 1099? 
7 I A He wanted me to help him with it and—and 
8 that's when I took my file into his office and we went 
9 through his ledger. He—he and Craig didn't like each 
other and I—I always felt like that—that James wanted 
to make sure that Craig wasn't putting stuff in there 
that should not be. And so we went through it and James 
asked me if I would help him take care of it. 
Q Had James just investigated an embezzlement at 
15 I Neways? 
16 , A He did. 
17 I Q Did that somehow involve you? 
A It did. 
Q Did he resolve that? 
A Yes. 
Q How was it resolved? 
A It was resolved by me admitting me that I was 
the one that had done it and I paid back the money. 
Q Did James ever ask to have you fired? 
A I don't know what he said to Tom and Dee. 
10 
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MR. BLACK: Do we have the exhibits 
from yesterday? 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I have 
those. It's right here. 
MR. BLACK: May we have all those 
exhibits up in front of the witness rather than— 
MR. WINEGAR: Yes. 
MR. BLACK: —with counsel? 
Q (By Mr. Black) So, Defendant's Exhibit 2 is 
the contract you mentioned? 
A Yes. That is. 
Q And that states it was for 60? 
A And that was 60. 
Q Okay. Do you have any idea how long that 
contract was in effect between James Thompson and Neways? 
A Probably for about four or five months. 
Q Okay. And when did it go out of effect? Is 
that in the February period when Neways started working 
with A-Plus Benefits? 
A We were not working with A-Plus Benefits until 
April. 
Q Okay. So he—he was basically employed by 
Neways then until he—he went to work for A-Plus 
Benefits; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
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through A-Plus, our payroll people. We were doing it 
directly from our accounts payable. 
A Uh huh. 
Q So, it was in—it was in lieu of—it was not in 
lieu of the payroll that was—that he had with A-Plus 
Benefits; is that correct? 
A That's correct. It—it was—well, it—it was 
monies that we gave to James that did not run through and 
would be recorded on a W-2 income, so it didn't go 
through A-Plus. 
Q Okay. 
A We said this money was in—in lieu of that 
Q Okay. So—and—and therefore, it would be 
reported on a 1099— 
A Yes. 
Q —is that correct? 
And that was always your understanding? That 
this money that was paid directly for James' benefit was 
to be reported on a 1099, wasn't it? 
A It was. 
Q James never told you that he didn't want it 
reported on a 1099, did he? 
A No. 
Q And you've testified that James was angry when 
he received the first 1099; is that correct? 
165 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 A He was. 
2 Q He was angry because he thought it wasn't 
3 accurate, wasn't he? 
4 A He—he felt like that it was too high. 
g Q And did he think part of the deal—did he tell 
g you that part of the deal was that he would have his 
7 income accurately reflected? 
g A When he made the comment that this wasn't part 
of the deal, I—I assumed—I was—you know, I assumed a 
lot of things; but I—I didn't know if he meant between 
he and Tom and Dee. 
Q Okay. 
A And--
Q So you just didn't know what the arrangement 
was between he and Tom and Dee, did you? 
A No. 
17 Q Okay. But then he sat down with you to try and 
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accurately portray the 1099, didn't he? 
A That's right. We went through my checks versus 
his ledger. 
Q Okay. And that ledger is Exhibit No. 1, isn't 
it? 
A It is. 
Q And did you make a conclusion that that 
original 1099 was inaccurate, based upon those 
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conversations with him? 
A There—if I remember right, there were a few 
things on there that I questioned. That—at that point, 
I was being moved out of the department and it was hard 
for me to do anything. At that point, I had to turn it 
over to Craig and to Dee to take care of it. 
Q Okay. So you were leaving the department at 
that time, but you— 
A Right. 
Q —but you, after going through his day timer 
with the 1099s, you believed there—there could be or 
could have been some inaccuracies? 
A There could have been a few things. 
Q Okay. And in fact, didn't he tell you— 
A But I did—oh, can I— 
Q Go ahead. 
A I didn't— 
Q Yes, please do. 
A I didn't know a lot of details, so it would 
have really been TTard for me to, you know, to really make 
that decision. 
Q Okay. And isn't it true that there were 
questions about travel expenses that were—that could 
have been included on the original 1099 that should not 
have been there? 
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A That was the part that I do remember 
questioning was the travel part. 
Q Okay. And during the preliminary hearing, I 
asked you this question: Did James ever talk to you 
about the 1099? 
And do you remember this answer? He did. He 
asked me if I would go through the records and verify 
that the things he was being charged on the 1099 were 
actual expenses to him or he—he was concerned that 
possibly Craig had put in things that were not—should 
not go to him, such as maybe travel expenses or something 
like that. He just wanted me to verify that the amounts 
were correct. 
A That's true. 
Q He didn't come to you for any other reason than 
to say, Is it correct? Did he? 
A Huh uh. 
Q Did James ever ask you to zero out the 1099? 
A He asked me to—to help him with it. 
Q To—to get the correct amount; is that correct? 
A Uh huh. 
Q But he never asked you to zero out the 1099, 
did he? 
A I—I do not remember him asking me to zero it 
out. He just wanted me to help him take care of it. 
168 
James had not entered into that agreement voluntarily 
with the State to do that? 
A I didn't know that. 
Q To pay his legal and lawful child support 
obligations? 
A Yeah. That, I wouldn't have known. I was just 
served with the papers (inaudible) 
MR. BLACK: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Uh huh. 
MR. WINEGAR: Just a brief—few brief 
questions, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WINEGAR: 
Q I think you testified that you sat down with 
James and compared his journal to the checks you had in 
the file? 
A That's true. 
Q What was the purpose in doing that? 
A I think that he wanted to make sure that we had 
the same things that he had—that I had what he had, that 
he had what I had. 
Q What were the checks supposedly represented in 
the journal, then? Amounts that were actually paid on 
his behalf? 
A Payments from Neways. 
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Q For him personally? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember talking to an investigator from 
the Utah State Tax Commission in December of 1997? 
A Uh huh. 
Q Do you remember telling him that in fact the 
defendant had— 
MR. BLACK: Objection to the 
question. It—it's leading. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, she has 
testified differently in the past than she does now. The 
same as he crossed her with her record at the preliminary 
hearing, we have evidence that she testified differently 
to a—an investigator from the Utah State Commission. I 
want to see if she remembers that. 
MR. BLACK: He's her (sic) witness, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Proceed with your next 
questions. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you remember talking to 
Mr. Haywood from the Utah State Tax Commission? 
A I do. 
Q Do you remember what you told him about whether 
the defendant had asked you to zero out the 1099 or not? 
A I told him that— 
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MR. BLACK: Ob—objection. It's 
leading. 
THE COURT: Overruled. She can 
answer. 
THE WITNESS: I told him that I felt 
like that James wanted me to zero it out but that I 
couldn't. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) You talked about 
garnishments, and do you remember if there were other 
garnishment orders that came in on behalf of the 
defendant? 
A There were others that came. 
Q Could any of those other ones, besides the 
child support, be paid? 
A No. 
MR. WINEGAR: No further questions. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BLACK: 
Q Is that zero it out in the context of making it 
accurate, is that what you're talking about when you say 
zero it out? 
A I—I would have to say yes, to make it 
accurate. 
Q Okay. Thank you. Now, I'd like you to 
remember back to the preliminary hearing when I asked you 
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•is an enlargement of 
like that document? 
in entries after he 
A Yeah. I saw him writing in the journal. 
Q Was it just after he received a check or made a 
check request? 
MR. BLACK: Objection. Leading. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) When was it? 
A It would depend. At—at first, I did not know 
about this journal, it—it was in a Franklin planner, on 
his desk. 
Q Uh huh. 
A At first, I didn't know it was in there. After 
I learned what was in there, then occasionally I would 
see him writing things in the—in the journal; a lot of 
times, it was after a check had been cut and I had given 
it to him but not always. 
Q Do you know if the defendant ever received a 
1099 from Neways for these payments? 
A I know he received a 1099, yes. 
Q How do you know that? 
A I saw it. 
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Q Did he call you up from Hawaii and talk to you 
concerning this 1099? 
A He wanted it changed• 
Q Did he ask any other action be taken concerning 
the 1099? 
A Craig Spencer was an individual who worked in 
the accounting department that James was upset with 
because of this 1099 and he wanted James to be gone 
before he came back from Hawaii* 
Q Did he tell you why he wanted him gone? 
A There were a couple of different issues; one 
was expense reports showing receipts for expenses that he 
had incurred during business trips, and— 
Q Explain about that. What do you mean, expense 
reports and receipts? 
MR. BLACK: Objection. Foundation. 
THE COURT: Ask her if she understand 
what expense reports— 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you know what an expense 
report is? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know if the defendant ever filled any of 
those out? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know if the defendant ever was— 
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about? 
A It is. 
Q What did you do with this memo? 
A I typed it up, he approved it, I took it down 
to Dee to show her it, she happened to be in the office 
and she came in, read it and she wrote a note back to him 
on the bottom of this memo* 
Q And when what did you do with it? 
A Took it back up to James. 
MR. WINEGAR: I would move that 
State's Exhibit 16 be admitted into evidence. 
MR. BLACK: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: 16's received. 
May I see that, please? 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you know if there are 
companies associated with Neways that are kind of under 
the Neways' umbrella? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you know if the legal department did any 
work concerning these other companies? 
A Yes, we do. 
Q Do you know if they were paid any differently 
for work for these legal companies versus Neways itself? 
A No. Everyone's paid under Neways. 
Q Everyone? Were you paid by Neways? 
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Virgin Islands. 
Q Did you ever do any work in trying to set those 
companies up? 
A I made a lot of phone calls, research, getting 
information kind of things and then I would report back 
to James about what I found out. 
Q Were you ever asked to make telephone calls to 
find out if a bank had a cash card that you could 
withdraw money from in the United States? 
MR. BLACK: Objection. Leading. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Did you ever make any 
telephone calls to banks? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q What were those calls concerning? 
A At one point, I was asked to call about a (sic) 
ATM card, to find out if there was a way that we could 
get an ATM card to get the money from the corporations in 
the British Virgin Islands and to call—I was asked to 
call several banks and find out if they had such a thing 
as an ATM card that you could use from the States. 
Q Did the defendant ever explain to you why he 
was interested in finding this? 
A That would be a way to get the money from the 
British Virgin Islands and use it here. 
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Glencoe, Georgia. 
Q Do you know the defendant in this case? 
A I do. 
Q How did you first become aware of him? 
A We received an anonymous packet in the mail. 
Q And what made you decide to start an 
investigation? 
A The—the information in the packet, we do what 
we call a primary investigation, where we look at the 
initial documents or whatever the evidence may be that we 
have. And then at that point, we determine whether or 
not there's enough evidence to do a subject 
investigation, which we determined there was and we did a 
subject investigation. 
Q Did you obtain any documents in the course of 
your investigation? 
A I did. 
Q Did you get an employment contract? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What other documents did you obtain? 
A We received copies of 1099s from Neways, W-2s 
from Neways, the employment contract like you mentioned 
and copies of check requests and also checks that were 
made out to different payees. 
Q Did you get his Federal and State Tax Returns 
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Q And what did you find out? 
A The total taxable income came—turned out to be 
$53,750.86. 
Q Was that less than what was reported on his 
Utah State Income Tax return? 
A Yes. It was. 
Q Excuse me. Was it more than what was reported 
on his Utah State Tax return? 
A Was it more? 
Q The figure that you calculated? 
A Yeah. Well, yes, the figure was more that we 
calculated. 
Q Did you calculate how much additional tax owing 
he would have then? 
A Yes. Yes, I did. 
Q And how much was that? 
A That was—his tax came out to be $3,564.56. 
Q Did you give him any credit for the taxes that 
he had paid prior? 
A We did. We gave him a credit of $1,422. And 
the net—the net tax deficiency came out to be $2,142.56. 
Q Mr. Shimizu, are you a tax expert? 
A No. I'm not. 
Q Did you do anything to verify, to see whether 
these figures were correct or not? 
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THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you recognize that 
document? 
A Yes. I do. 
MR. BLACK: Your Honor, I—I—we need 
to approach one more time. 
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was 
held at side bar.) 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you recognize that 
document? 
A Yes. I do. 
Q Can you tell me what it is? 
A It's a summary of third-party payees that was— 
that I prepared. 
Q Did you prepare it? 
A I—yes, I did. 
Q What did you base that upon? 
A We took the information that we had obtained 
from Neways and took the check requests, put them in one 
category, took the cancelled checks that we had, that was 
another category. We had the J.L.T. journal category, 
which is Mr. Thompson's journal right here, we matched 
that up with the checks and the check requests and then 
the general ledger is Mr. Spencer's document, where he 
went through and took all the checks and then added them 
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Q Okay. But you don't remember for sure, even 
now? 
A Well, that's why we did that summary so—to 
make it a little bit easier to—for everybody, you know, 
to be able to figure it out. 
Q So you don't remember for sure even now? 
A Well," I think it was one of them. 
Q Now, is the carbon copy of the check there? 
A Of the 610? 
Q That $610? Are there any notations on that 
check? 
A Just says Zions First National Bank. 
Q Doesn't say anything else, does it? 
A No. 
Q Doesn't say James Thompson, does it? 
A Not on the check, no. 
Q Okay. So you had to connect this with that 
check tissue so that somebody helped you do that, didn't 
they? 
A Well, it was done in—yeah, it was done in 
connection with the investigation, correct. 
Q Okay. Did you ever talk to James Thompson 
about that? 
A About this check? 
Q About that check request and the check? 
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A Not this particular one, I don't believe we 
did. 
Q Okay. Did you ever talk to Zions Bank about 
it? 
A No. We didn't. 
Q So, you're—you're assuming that this check 
that was made payable to Zions Bank that doesn't have any 
reference to James Thompson on it was on his behalf 
solely because of a check request form that is attached 
to it; is that correct? 
A That's most of it, correct. 
Q Okay. Do you know if Neways has accounts at 
Zions? 
A We were told they did. 
Q Okay. So you don't know for certain whether or 
not this check was for James Thompson's benefit or for 
some other purpose? It's a guess, isn't it? 
A Well, the—like I said, the check request says 
Re: James Thompson on it, so it's—I don't know if it's a 
guess. It's—it would look like that $610 was for his 
benefit. 
Q And you've—and you've never gone to the payee 
on the check and asked for whose benefit that was for? 
A No. We didn't. 
Q Wouldn't that have been appropriate to find out 
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if they thought it was not for them as well? 
A What do you—I don#t understand your question. 
Q Wouldn't that have been appropriate, gone to 
the person who got that check and said, who was this for? 
A Who was this for? 
Q Yes. Wouldn't it have been appropriate to go 
to Zions Bank, the person to whom the check was made out 
for, and find out who it was for? 
A Well, we didn't do it in the scope of the 
investigation. 
Q You never once did it, did you? You never once 
went to the payee of the check and ask them if that was 
for their benefit or for somebody else's, did you? 
A Not on these, we didn't. No. 
Q On any checks? Isn't that true, on any checks? 
A Yeah. We didn't. 
Q So, how can you be sure that the payee of the 
check didn't get that check? How can you be sure of 
that? 
A Well, I'm not saying that a payee didn't get 
the check. What we were saying is, it was on Mr. 
Thompson's behalf that the money was paid. 
Q And how can you be sure it was not payable to 
the payee as opposed to on Mr. Thompson's behalf? 
A Well, that's why, on some of them, where we had 
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the cancelled checks, we could actually tell. On some cf 
them, they didn't have the cancelled checks and we 
couldn't tell for sure. 
Q And where there are not cancelled checks, it's 
your best guess, isn't it? 
A We used the best available evidence we had. 
Q Okay. Is that your best guess, whether or not 
cancelled checks— 
A Well, I wouldn't call it a guess, but— 
Q Speculation? 
A Like I said, it appears from the check 
requests, you know, when it says Re: James Thompson, 
that the check would have gone for his benefit. 
Q Now, you've indicated that you didn't—weren't 
able to find cancelled checks for all the checks that 
were made payable to the payees; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Where did you look? 
A Where did I look? 
Q Yeah. 
A Well, we—we relied on Neways to provide us 
with those cancelled checks as part of— 
Q And they didn't have the cancelled checks for 
all the payees? 
A That's what they told us, they didn't have all 
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the cancelled checks. 
Q Can you tell me which ones in the 743,000 
figure that you used they had cancelled checks for? 
A What do you want me to do, name every one of 
them off, or— 
Q Yeah. I'd like you to tell me which checks 
that—that were included in the $73,000 figure in Exhibit 
17 they didn't have cancelled checks for. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I think he 
testified earlier that he has a summary. Maybe that 
would assist him in going through this. (Inaudible) able 
to remember these hundreds of checks. 
THE COURT: Well, and I think to get 
there, Mr. Shimizu would have to indicate that he doesn't 
have a recollection without refreshing his memory. 
MR. WINEGAR: All right. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. I don't remember 
every check. I don't. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Do you have the specific list 
any place of the—of the checks that were not returned? 
Excuse me, that—that Neways said they did not have 
cancelled checks for? 
A It's on that summary that we prepared. There's 
a column that—that talks about cancelled checks. 
Q Okay. So at this point, without further 
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refreshing your memory, you can't tell me which thing— 
which amounts are in that $73,000 that Neways actually 
had cancelled checks for or not? 
A Well, it's— 
Q Yes or no. 
A —it's actually the 50,000; but no, I can't 
tell you exactly every check. 
Q Okay. Okay. The—and when—and the reason you 
say the 50, is it's 'cause it's the 23 plus the 50— 
A Right. 
Q —from the cancelled checks? 
A Right. 
Q Right. I'll include the—the 73 as the total 
for my convenience, 'cause that's how I think of it— 
A Okay. 
Q —for the future; but thank you for clarifying 
that. 
A Yeah. 
Q Do you know what amount of checks they didn't 
have cancelled checks for? 
A What do you mean what amount? The total amount 
or— 
Q Yeah. The total amount of checks that 
allegedly were paid on behalf of Neways that they didn't 
have cancelled checks for? 
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-I A Well, right off the top of my head, I can't—I 
2 don't know the exact figure, but there was approximately 
3 six—six or seven checks on our summary that there were 
4 not cancelled checks for, that we didn't, you know, 
5 i include in the—in the total. 
6 I Q So it's your testimony that if you—if there 
7 was not a cancelled check, you did not include it in the 
8 , total? 
g I A What—what I'm trying to explain is, we try to 
give the people the benefit of the doubt. If we don't 
have enough evidence to show that yes, this was 
definitely a payment that they probably received, we—we 
just excluded, which there was quite a few payments we 
ex—we excluded. 
THE COURT: So—just so I understand. 
So if Neways couldn't provide you a cancelled check for 
17 I one of the things that Mr. Thompson requested payment on, 
18 , that is not part of the $50,000 total? 
19 THE WITNESS: Yeah. In most of the 
PQ I cases, that was correct. 
21 I THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: Now, there were—there 
were a few cases where like we had the check request form 
and then like a journal entry or something; so if we had 
those, then we—we probably included it. 
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Q (By Mr* Black) Okay. So your testimony toda 
is that there are amounts that you included in the 
$50,000 that you got from some source other than the W-~s 
that—that—that you did not see cancelled checks for? 
A There were a few that weren't—there were no 
cancelled checks. 
Q And you don't know how many they were and you 
can't tell me right now? 
A Well— 
Q Just yes or no. Can you— 
A No. 
Q —tell me right now? 
A No. 
Q And you don't know if that—how much that would 
reduce the $50,000 figure? 
A It wouldn't reduce the $50,000 figure because 
we didn't include them. If we didn't have the evidence 
like the cancelled check and the check request, you know, 
stuff like that, we didn't include it, because we try, 
like I said before, we try to give the person the benefit 
of the doubt— 
Q Okay. 
A —in that scenario. 
Q Okay. And I didn't understand your testimony. 
So, you're saying there is not a single cancelled check 
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or a single entry in the $50,000 where you do not have a 
check to back it up, a cancelled check to back it up? 
A Well, I'm not saying that. I'm saying most of 
the entries where we—where we counted them, we had at 
least two or possibly three or four of the—the items 
listed. 
Q Okay. So—so what—what it has is—you're— 
you're testifying there are some within the 50,000 that 
you may not have had the cancelled check for? 
A Possibly. 
Q Okay. And you can't tell me what they were? 
A Well, right off the bat, you know, I—I can't 
tell you— 
Q Okay. 
A —because there was probably about 40 to 50 
checks at least— 
Q Okay. 
A —on there. 
Q Okay. So, you can't tell me what they were— 
well, let's go back just a minute to the cancelled 
checks. Are you aware of the significance of a cancelled 
check? 
A In what context? 
Q If somebody has a cancelled check, is that 
generally evidence that the check was negotiated? 
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A Yeah. 
Q Okay. 
cancelled check, 
Generally. 
And would you say if there's not a 
it's at least some evidence that the 
check wasn't negotiated? 
A Possibility. 
Q Okay. So you have included in your $50,000 
entries for things—for checks that may not have even 
been negotiated, so far as you know? 
A Only if we didn^fe-have the cancelled check. 
Q Yeah. Where you didn't have the cancelled 
check and where that was included in the 50,000, you 
don't even know if that check was negotiated, do you? 
A Not for a fact, no. 
Q Not for a fact. 
A Well, we were relying on the information from 
Neways that they were providing the checks to us. 
Q Okay. And you hope Neways' information is 
correct, don't you? 
A We hope it's correct? 
Q (Inaudible) correct, don't you? 
A It appeared to be correct from the 
information— 
Q You don't know if it's correct, do you? 
A It appeared to be correct. 
Q Okay. Did you hear testimony today that on 
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-( Schedule 6, excuse me, 
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A Schedule 6? 
Q Yes. The check request forms. 
A Oh. You mean Exhibit 6? 
2 
3 
4 
5 I Q Yeah. Exhibit 6. 
6 i A Oh. 
7 I Q Excuse me. 
8 Now, I'm looking at the 4-26-96. 
A Yeah. The first—first one to Zions? 
Q Yeah. Does it say any place on there that that 
was requested by James Thompson to be paid on his behalf? 
A I think we've already discussed this; but it 
doesn't say it on the check, no. 
Q No. Okay. I'm going to the check request 
form. 
A Oh. Okay. The re—the check request form says 
17 description Re: James Thompson on it. 
Q Requested by who? 
A Annette. 
Q Not James Thompson? 
A Well, that's what the form says is requested by 
Annette. 
Q Okay. Now, let's go to the next one for Clair 
Davis Welding requested by Annette, not James Thompson; 
is that correct? 
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1 A Yeah. That's what it says. 
2 Q Let's go to the next one. Requested, Zions 
3 Bank, requested by who? 
4 A Well, which one are we on 'cause there's— 
5 Q I'm sorry. Zions Bank (inaudible) address, 
S.F., requested a t — 
7 I A Three thousand five hundred. Okay. It's 
g requested by James. 
g Q Okay. So that one was requested by James? 
A Correct. 
Q Fair? 
A It appears that—yeah. 
Q Now, let's go to Aloha Islanders— 
A Okay. 
Q —5-22-96; was that requested by James? 
A Says requested by Annette. 
17 Q Next one, Common (inaudible) and I'm probably 
18 
19 
20 
21 
butchering that pronunciation; 5-22-96. Was that 
requested by James? 
A Says requested by Annette. 
Q Next one, to James Thompson, I guess that's 
22 I requested by Annette but I think (inaudible) got that. 
A Yeah. 
Q The next one's to Smith's, requested by 
Annette, 5-22-96? 
23 
24 
25 
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A 
Q 
Annette? 
A 
Q 
Right. 
Next one's Zions Bank again, requested by 
Uh huh. 
Now, you've testified—and—and as we go 
through here, many of them, in fact, most of them say 
that they were requested by Annette, don't they? 
A Yeah. Quite a few of them do. 
Q Probably in excess of 90 percent of them do, 
don't they? 
A Well, I don't know what the percentage would 
be, but— 
Q Okay. 
A —there's quite a few. 
Q Okay. You've testified that a check was made 
to Frank Nicholson; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I think 
that mischaracterized it. The bill was to U.S. Cellular 
is what he testified to, not who it was in behalf of. 
MR. BLACK: Thank you, Counsel. 
Q (By Mr. Black) You've testified that a bill 
was paid to U.S. Cellular for a Frank Nicholson account; 
is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
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Q Okay. And you' 
understanding that is Mr. 
that correct? 
A That' 
Q Now, 
for personal or 
s correct. 
ve testified that it's your 
Thompson's half brother; is 
do you know if that cellular 
• for business purposes? 
bill was used 
A Do I know that? 
Q Yeah. 
A No. 
Q Did you ask Frank Nicholson? 
A No. We didn't talk to Frank Nicholson. 
Q Did you ask Mr. Thompson? 
A No. 
Q Did you ask U.S. West? 
A No. 
Q Did you subpoena their records to determine who 
made the calls and to where they went? 
A I don't know how you could tell who made the 
call. There would— 
Q You could tell where they went, couldn't you? 
A Yeah. They could—yeah, that shows where they 
went, correct. 
Q So you don't have any notion at all that that 
was not an expense, a business expense paid on behalf of 
Neways where he had used that phone? 
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Craig Spencer has testified that he thought that he had a 
duty to accurately report those 1099s? 
A Again, I didn't—I didn't hear his testimony— 
Q Okay. 
A —so I can't really answer the question. 
Q Do you remember at the preliminary hearing when 
I asked you if your conclusions as to the $50,000 weren't 
your best guess and you testified yes, they were your 
best guess? 
A I don't remember that right off the bat, no. 
Q Would you turn to Page 118? Line 8. 
So, it's just your best guess based upon that 
it says Re: James Thompson; correct? 
ANSWER: It's my best guess based on the 
information we received from Neways' employees. 
So it's your best guess based upon information 
that you did not personally have? 
A Well, I don't know if guess is the word. I—I 
said it there; but I think it was the best information we 
had available to us. 
Q So you didn't mean best guess even though you 
testified to the word "best guess"? 
A Well, again, I—I said—I did say "guess", but 
I don't know that "guess" was the best word to use at 
that time. 
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then, your Honor, as an expert. 
THE COURT: Ms. MacKenzie just looks 
too young to have accomplished all that. 
THE WITNESS: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: Just look too young to 
have accomplished all that. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Have you had a chance to 
review the tax file of the defendant, James Thompson? 
A Yes. I have. 
MR. WINEGAR: If I can approach, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) I'm going to retrieve what 
have been marked as State's Exhibits 1 and 2. Did you 
review the Federal— 
A Excuse me, Wade. These are 3 and 4. 
Q Excuse me. They may be 3 and 4. Excuse me. 3 
and 4, which are the Federal Income Tax Return, the Form 
1040, and then the State return? 
A Yes. 
Q Tell me a little bit about the inter-
relationship between the Federal return and the State 
return. 
A The—the—your taxable income from your Federal 
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return is the basis for your taxable income with some 
adjustments that are outlined in the tax code for your 
State return; in other words, they're the same, you know, 
you use the same—it actually starts out with F.A.G.I. 
but the actual code section says taxable income and your 
taxable income is the same and then you make certain 
adjustments# you know, for example, you get a deduction 
for half of the—of your Federal tax liability, several 
other things that are outlined in the code that you get 
deductions for in determining your State taxable income. 
Q If your Federal adjusted gross income is 
incorrect, would that also make your State inc—adjusted 
gross income incorrect? 
A Yes. 
Q If an employee has checks issued on his behalf 
and they're an employee of a company, would that be 
considered to be wages for that individual if they were 
made for personal payments on his behalf? 
A Yes. 
MR. BLACK: Objection, your Honor. 
I—I believe that is an open issue for the trier of fact, 
what is—what is wages and what is not wages. It's one 
of the questions of fact for the Court—for the jury. 
THE COURT: Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: I think the whole 
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question that has been here is, number one, it's a 
hypothetical: Are third-party payments wages? 
THE COURT: Objection's overruled. 
She can answer. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Could you please answer that? 
A Yes. 
Q If an individual is an employee of a company 
and receives a salary check for wages and the individual 
also received payments on his behalf to third-parties, 
how would those be classified? 
A They would be wages. If—I assume the payments 
are being made as remuneration for services performed by 
the employee? 
Q Yes. 
A Then— 
THE COURT: Let—let me interject. I 
think you used the wrong word, Mr. Winegar. You said the 
individual receives. It's not what happens. The 
individual directs payments to be made on his behalf to 
other people. 
MR. WINEGAR: Okay. 
THE COURT: Isn't that right? 
MR. WINEGAR: Right. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) If the individual directs 
certain payments be made on his behalf, would those be 
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If the defendant recognized that, would he 
still be required to report that— 
A Yes. 
Q —as income? 
And so any other payments that weren't included 
on the 1099, (inaudible) if they knew that they had 
received those payments, would they still be required to 
report those, even though they weren't on the 1099? 
A Yes. 
Q Would that affect their tax liability if they 
had to include that? 
A Yes. 
Q Would it raise their tax liability? 
A Yes. 
Q Looking at State's Exhibit 17, what is the 
amount that you calculated in this particular case with 
the facts you were given, that the defendant owes in 
taxes? 
A That he owes in tax? $2,142.56. 
Q And would that be giving him credit for the 
amount that he paid? 
A For the withholding, yes, and the amount he 
paid. 
MR. WINEGAR: I have no further 
questions, your Honor. 
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Q Okay. Now— 
A Do you want me to list you which checks those 
were? 
Q No. That's all right. 
A Okay. 
Q So as you're going down what checks are—which 
deductions are acceptable and which deductions are not 
acceptable on Mr. Thompson's Schedule C, you're saying 
they're all not acceptable because you believe him to 
have been an employee— 
A Yes. 
Q —that would have had to have been on a—that— 
that those deductions would have had to have been on a— 
A Form 2106. 
Q —2106 and that he could have deducted there, 
subject to the two percent limit; is that correct? 
A Uh huh. 
Q Okay. Now, all of your calcu— 
A Not all of them, though. Only—only the meals 
and the car expenses— 
Q Okay. 
A —are allowed. 
Q Okay. But those—and the—and the wages and 
the other things would not have even been deductible, 
period, would they? 
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Q It can be complex, can't it? 
A Yes. 
Q As a matter of fact, it can be one of the most 
complex questions in looking at any employer-employee 
relationship, can't it? What is the nature of that 
relationship? 
A It depends on the situation. 
Q Each situation is different? 
A Yes. Some-situations are very clearly, so... 
Q Is it true that volumes and volumes of 
litigation have revolved around that exact issue? 
A Yes. 
Q Hundreds, if not thousands of cases across the 
United States revolve around that issue? 
A Yes. 
Q And has any court any place ever said that 
you're aware of that that determination is based upon one 
factor, without all the other factors? 
A No. 
Q Complex issue; right? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, typically when—who's legal obligation is 
it to make the determination as to if a payee of a check 
is an employee or an independent contractor? 
A I don't know. 
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A Normally the employee coming in does. 
Q Okay. So the employee can come in and say, I'm 
an independent contractor or I'm an employee? Okay? 
A Yes. 
Q That—that's your thought? 
Now, let's say that an employer wrongfully 
categorizes somebody as a—as an independent contractor 
as opposed to an employee. 
A Okay. 
Q Typically, it's the employer that has to pay 
those taxes back, employment taxes back, that result from 
that wrongful categorization, isn't it? 
A Yes. But the employee placed them also on the 
return. 
Q That—that's on the tax return, but if emp—if-
-if an employer fails to pay withholding taxes— 
A Yes. 
Q —on somebody who should have been categorized 
as an employee— 
A Yes. 
Q —they have—the employer—the employer has to 
pay those taxes back, don't they? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now, and it's your allegation that—it's 
your position that Neways wrongfully categorized Mr. 
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Q What were your duties in the accounting 
department during 1996? 
A 
assets. 
Q 
I did accounts payable, sales tax and fixed 
I'm going to show you— 
THE COURT: The last thing was what? 
THE WITNESS: Fixed assets. 
1 
2 
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8 I THE COURT: Fixed assets. Okay. 
9 Q (By Mr. Winegar) I'm going to show you some 
.jQ i documents— 
-- I THE COURT: Put them in order, 
12 please. 
MR. WINEGAR: Oh. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) These exhibits, Exhibits 8, 9 
and 10, do you recognize those documents? 
A I do. 
Q Can you tell me what—first of all, on 9, can 
you tell me what that is? 
A This would be check stubs from checks that I 
had cut while employed at Neways. 
Q Did you cut them personally? 
A I did. 
Q How about No. 10? 
A This would actually be the copies of the checks 
that we had kept for back-up for checks that I had cut 
305 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 I DIRECT EXAMINATION fContinuing) 
3 BY MR. WINECAR: 
4 Q Mr. Spencer, were you aware that the 
5 defendant's salary was reduced in February of 1996? 
g A I am now, yes. 
j Q Did you start issuing checks based upon checks 
8 requests—check requests in February or March of 1996, in 
a behalf of the defendant or as directed by the defendant? 
A As far as I know, we did them—we started in 
March of 1996. 
Q Did you have to go back and try and recreate 
the records and find out exactly what had been done, 
later in 1996? 
MR. BLACK: Objection. It's leading. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Did you ever go back and 
review the files? 
A I did. 
Q When did you do that? 
A In the fall; October or November, towards the 
end of the year so I could get 1099 data together. 
Q I'm going to show you what has been marked as 
State's Exhibit 6 and 6A; do you recognize these 
documents? 
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A I do, 
Q Can you tell me what they are? 
A They are check requests made out by—most of 
them are made out by Annette Jenkins in behalf of James 
Thompson and copies, carbon copies of the checks that 
were cut for those check requests. 
Q And who cut those checks? 
A I did. 
Q Do these—how would you decide whether 
something went in the defendant's file or not, based upon 
these check requests? 
A If it said it was regarding James Thompson, R-e 
James Thompson, it was coded to a special general ledger 
account and then filed in a different folder. There was 
a folder for his business-related, for like travel 
reimbursements and other business-related expenses, and 
then there was a file for the special checks that were 
regarding James. 
Q Did you put those checks in that file? 
A I did. 
Q And are these the documents here that you in 
fact put in there? 
A They are. 
Q You testified a little bit earlier that, I 
think in September or October, you went back and tried to 
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recreate the file; how far back did you go to try and 
find these payments? 
A I believe I went back to the 1st of March. 
That was when I was told it began—I was told it began. 
Q Did you ever have anything to do with issuing a 
1099 to the defendant? 
A I did. 
Q Tell me about it. What happened? 
A When we originally started to—to make these 
payments, I had asked Annette Jenkins basically how he 
was going to pay taxes on this income and she had said— 
indicated that a 1099 was probably in line. 
In the fall, I asked her again, just to make 
sure that I was clear, that's why we were keeping the 
special file and she—she said it was. In January, after 
I had started to collect the data, in fact, I believe I'd 
collected most of the preliminary data from—we actually 
had set up a special general ledger account where, 
whenever I cut a check, it would be coded to an account, 
the number was 5559 and it was a special legal consulting 
fees expense account that everything that had the 
"regarding James Thompson" would get coded to that 
account when it was entered in the sys—into the accounts 
payable system. 
I—so I ran a detailed balance that would show 
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1 me all the transactions that hit that account that year 
2 and I was able to double-check my file to make sure that 
3 I had back-up for the ones that I had that showed up on 
4 that sheet; either I had back-up for them and they got 
5 mis-coded or they were coded to that account and I could 
5 find back-up for them. 
7 Do you want me to continue? 
8 Q Continue and tell me what you did. 
g A I—I then compiled them on a spread sheet and 
10 we issued the 10—in January, I asked Mrs. Mower once 
^ I again to make sure that this was going to be 1099'ed and 
«I2 I that everybody was aware of that and she said yeah. So, 
13 w e — 1 issued the 1099 at the end of January. 
Q Were you aware of any other employees at Neways 
that had—or directed checks to be issued on their 
behalf, other than the defendant? 
A No. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
-|g I Q I'm going to show you what has been marked as 
State's Exhibit 19; do you recognize that document? 
A I do. 
Q Who prepared it? 
A I did. 
Q What does it reflect? 
A It reflects the amount—after the original 1099 
was issued, I was told to make sure to review the—the 
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1 charges that we had—that we had issued the 1099 on by 
2 Mrs. Mower, and so I recompiled the list and the amount 
3 that I found was actually more than the amount we had 
4 originally 1099'ed him—1099'ed the defendant. 
5 Q How much more was it? 
6 A A little over 8,000. 
Y Q And what was the original amount that you put 
8 on the 1099, the first 1099 you sent out? 
A 46,139.35. 
Q Do you know what the defendant's reaction was 
when he received that 1099? 
A I heard he was pretty upset. 
MR. BLACK: Objection. Ask that be 
stricken. That's hear—clearly hearsay. 
15 I THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
That's stricken. 
Q Were you ever asked to prepare a different 
1099? 
A I was. 
Q I'm going to show you what has been marked as 
State's Exhibit 20. Do you recognize that document? 
A I do. 
Q Can you tell me what it is? 
A It is—actually, the—it's another spread sheet 
that I had compiled, it's actually the original spread 
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sheet, just a little more detail. When I—when we were 
asked to change the 1099s, this is what I compiled. 
Q Do you know who was involved in negotiating 
what should be on or shouldn't be on the 1099? 
A I received this from Mrs. Mower, from Dee 
Mower, and I was told that her and James had went through 
these and had come up with—with what was for what 
purpose and why these amounts had been— 
MR. BLACK: Objection to the hearsay 
with—regarding what he said regarding what Mrs. Mower 
said. Move to strike, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: I think he's already 
answered, I mean— 
THE COURT: He has answered, but it 
is hearsay and it's stricken from the record, so the jury 
can disregard the answer. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Were you directed as to what 
should or shouldn't be put on the 1099, the second 1099 
that was issued? 
A I was. 
Q Did you ask for any substantiation or 
documentation to back up how you were breaking up these 
amounts and where they should go? 
A I did. I asked for receipts. 
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Q When you were breaking it up, tell me exactly 
what you—what process you went through. How did you 
decide what would be assigned to certain accounts? 
A From the writing that was—that Mrs. Mower had 
put next to the charges that was originally placed on 
this sheet. 
Q And for example, if you coded it to a different 
account besides the, I think you said the 5559 account, 
would it be reported on the 1099? 
A No. 
Q So, those bottom three boxes on this document 
that the jury will see, were they coded to someone else 
then so that it wouldn't be reported on the 1099? 
A The bottom three boxes? I'm sorry. 
Q Excuse me. The—the bottom three lines. For 
example— 
MR. BLACK: Ob—objection. It's— 
it's leading. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I'm just 
asking what his understanding of where the accounts went 
and where the money went according to the document that 
he prepared. 
THE COURT: That sounds like an 
acceptable question. Why don't you ask it that way? 
Q (By Mr, Winegar) Can you explain to me how you 
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accounted for it on the—the bottom portion? 
A Sure. We had—we expensed the telephone 
expenses and the legal consulting fees for the one—the 
one that says it was for off-shore consulting fees. We 
also 1099-ed the Liza Edsberg Trust for the amount—for 
the 9,250, plus the 1099 amount that was originally going 
to be sent for Dan Fish, to Dan Fish. 
Q Why didn't you 1099 Dan Fish? 
A Because I—I was told that it was for legal 
fees and had requested Social Security number and I never 
got it. 
Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as 
State's Exhibit No. 21; do you recognize that document? 
A I do. 
Q Can you tell me what that is? 
A It is the summary of the final 1099 that was 
sent out. 1099s, plural. 
Q Were certain expenses on that sheet not put on 
the 1099? 
A They were. 
Q Can you tell me which ones weren't? 
A The travel expense, the telephone expense and 
the off-shore consulting fees, and once again, there was 
once again, there was also a 1099 issued to the Liza 
Edsberg trust. 
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Q Okay. First of all, let's look at the—the 
telephone expenses. How much do you have there for 
telephone expenses? 
A $393.17. 
Q What—what did that include, what amounts did 
that include? 
A It included an amount of $40.32 to Tel America; 
$146.87 to U.S. Cellular; and $205.98 to Air Touch 
Cellular. 
Q You say the amount for Tel America was $40.32? 
A Yes. 
Q And what is the other amount? 
A U.S. West Cellular for 146.87. 
Q U.S. West Cellular for 146.87. 
And what was the final amount? 
A Air Touch Cellular for 205.98. 
Q 205.98 for Air Touch Cellular? 
A Right. 
Q What is the other amount that's on there that 
were not included on the 1099? 
A The travel expense of 6,812 and— 
Q Okay. 
A —and the off-shore consulting fees of 
7,837.28. 
Q First of all, the travel expenses, they weren't 
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included on the 1099; is that correct? 
A No, they weren't. 
Q How did you come up with those amounts? 
A I was told from Mrs. Mower that the $2,000— 
there was two $2,000 charges on the American Express, 
that in—both of them in June, I believe, of '96, that— 
Q And what were the dates that you have on your 
sheet? 
A June 6th and June 18th. 
Q June 6th then, there was an American Express 
payment for $2,000? 
A It was. There's two of them. And then one—or 
sorry, one for the 18th. 
Q June 18th for $2,000? 
A Right. 
Q And were you told to take those off? 
A I was. 
Q How about the other amounts that were included 
in travel? 
A The other amounts, he was also paid $2,000 to 
American Express on May 6th and May 22nd. 
Q May 6th, an American Express payment for 
$2,000? 
A Right. And May 22nd for $2,000. 
Q Okay. 
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A And of that, we 1099'ed him for $493 of the 
first American Express charge and 695 for the second one. 
That was amounts that Mrs. Mower told me that were for 
personal reasons, not for business travel. 
Q Tell me about the consulting fees. Were those 
included on the 1099 that was—that were sent to the 
defendant? 
MR. BLACK: Objection. It's 
ambiguous. There are multiple consulting fees. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) The consulting fee 
specifically in account number, on the sheet that you're 
looking at, 50— 
MR. WINEGAR: May I approach, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Off-shore consulting; 5556. 
A Okay. 
MR. BLACK: Okay. Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Can you tell me what that 
included? 
A It included a March 22nd charge to Pacific 
Consulting Trust of $2,000. 
Q What was the date, again? 
A March 22nd. 
Q To Pacific Consulting? 
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$1,637. 28 
Right. 
And how much was that for? 
$2,000. 
What were the other two amounts? 
There was one to Zions First National Bank for 
in May. 
And a $4,200 payment to C.C.P. Financial 
Consulting in—also in May. 
Q Do you know if those were included on the 1099? 
A They were not. 
Q Okay. Had you ever had problems with the 
defendant before? Did you get along well? 
MR. BLACK: Objection. It's vague 
and ambiguous, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. WINEGAR: Maybe I can rephrase 
it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled, He can 
answer. 
MR. BLACK: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: We didn't tend to see 
eye-to-eye, no. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) Do you know why? 
A I think a lot of it was the fact that I would 
ride him about getting receipts when he traveled. We 
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didn't—we didn't ever really hit it off, even from the 
beginning, and I'm not sure why, but I know that that 
didn't help. 
Q Did—did you ever have a problem getting 
receipts from the defendant? 
A I did. 
Q Did you ever ask for receipts from the 
defendant one time when he had returned from, I think it 
was the Bermudas? 
The British Virgin Islands? 
A British Virgin Islands, yes. 
Q What problems did you have? 
A He'd fill out an expense report for the advance 
that we'd given him and there was charges for meals on 
there that were unsubstantiated, there were no receipts. 
There was also a—an expense for scuba diving that I 
didn't think was probably a business-related expense. 
The—the meals, there was no receipts for and I 
had asked him where the receipts went. There wasn't even 
a—a description of where he had been, you know, what— 
who he had spent the money at, which probably would have 
been sufficient for me, at least once until I had issued 
a warning saying, you know, asking for the receipts; but 
he had just indicated that he was in primitive areas that 
didn't have receipts. 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 Q Did you ever write a memo to the defendant 
2 asking for receipts? 
3 I A I did. 
4 I Q Did you get any cooperation after that? 
5 MR. BLACK: I apologize to the 
6 witness and the Court, I spoke without thinking. 
7 THE WITNESS: Did I get a response? 
Yeah. He—the memo that I had written had—had let him 
know that I was not— 
MR. BLACK: Obj—objection at this 
point. He's testifying to a memo that's not been 
introduced into evidence. 
MR. WINEGAR: He's talking about what 
he wrote. 
THE COURT: Well, it's also—there's 
no question pending and he answered your question by 
17 saying, yeah. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
We need another question if he's going to 
testify further. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) What did you personally put 
in the memo? 
A I had indicated that—that I was not going to 
allow the scuba diving receipt and that I—I would allow 
the—the meals this one time, up to the per diem limit 
for the day and that I couldn't—I couldn't vouch for the 
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authenticity of the meals. The memo was also sent to 
Mrs. Mower. I wanted to, at that time, make sure that— 
that she knew I wasn't vouching that the meals were—were 
authentic, but that I was going to allow them to go 
through that time and that it wouldn't happen again. 
Q I'm going to show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 22; do you recognize that document? 
A I do. 
Q Can you tell me what it is? 
A It is a memo that I prepared to Allen Davis to 
summarize the events that led to the corrections of the 
1099 for James. 
Q Did you again ask for receipts in that memo? 
A I did. 
Q Did you ever get receipts? 
A No. I did not. 
Q I think prior, you testified that you were in 
accounts payable; is that correct? 
A It is. 
Q Did you ever see any invoices or documents for 
work that Liza Edsberg had done during your time at 
Neways? 
A No. I didn't. 
Q Did the defendant ever get reimbursed for meals 
while he was on travel that you handled? 
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A He did. 
Q How often? 
A Whenever he traveled, normally. 
Q Was that handled in a different system than 
you've testified about, these three exhibits that you 
1099'ed portions of them? 
A It was. It was the port—it was expensed 
directly to the travel expense and then filed in the 
other folder, the other James Thompson folder. 
Q So his reimbursements for that wouldn't be at 
all reflected on here? 
A They wouldn't, no. 
Q Did he ever ask you to be reimbursed for 
mileage on the company vehicle that he was driving? 
A He did. 
Q Did you ever reimburse him for that? 
A We did. 
Q At what rate? 
A Fifteen-and-a-half cents, I believe, a mile. 
Q Did you ever send a—a 1099 then to Dan Fish? 
A No. 
Q I'm going to show you what has been marked as 
State's Exhibit 23. Do you recognize that document? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell me what it is? 
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A It's another memo that I had prepared after 
discussing with Allen Davis how to classify employees, or 
the problems we were having with the misclassification of 
employees. 
Q Did you believe that Mr. Thompson shouldn't be 
receiving the third-party payments that he directed? 
A Yeah. I believed that he should not have been, 
to be under I.R.S. regulations. 
Q Now, you submitted, I think you testified 
earlier, the 1099s. Do you sign any form in conjunction 
with that, where you state you believe them to be 
accurate? 
A It is a 1096. 
Q Did you believe these 1099s to be accurate, 
that—in fact, let me retrieve the documents that we 
have, the 1099s. 
MR. BLACK: Objection. It's 
technically leading. 
THE COURT: He can answer. It wasn't 
leading. 
MR. BLACK: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Winegar) I'm going to show you two 
documents, 1099s issued by Neways; do you recognize those 
two documents? 
A I do. Yes. 
335 
